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INTRODUCTION 
 
ICJ judge P. H. Kooijmans has said that “gone are the days when international litigation was 
invariably either inter-State dispute settlement or commercial arbitration with a sparse mixture 
of the two in [the] case of State contracts. The post-World War II mechanisms give access to a 
great variety of non-state actors, be it individuals, corporations, business firms, minorities and 
indigenous peoples, non-governmental organizations and inter-governmental organizations.”1 
His quote emphasises issues that relate to globalisation nowadays. It further highlights one of 
the most highly debated issues in international law in the past, present and most probably also 
in the future – the problem of who can be the subjects of international law.  
This issue is not that simple as it might seem at first sight. In the current rapidly changing, 
globalising and highly complex world, many actors have some kind of impact on international 
law. Traditionally, only States were and sometimes still are considered as full actors of 
international law. However, in today’s world also many transnational organisations, 
governmental organisations and NGOs might have a considerable impact. For instance, NGOs 
have played an important role in international conferences and in the processes of adopting 
international conventions (e.g. Convention on Biodiversity2, Convention on the Rights of a 
Child3). Furthermore, some are of the view that NGOs exert the major source of pressure on 
states to comply with human rights treaties since some NGOs collect funds from people who 
care about human rights and then these NGOs monitor and put pressure on the perpetrators.4 
Nevertheless, there are many ways in which one can contribute to the process of international 
law. One of many possibilities is by way of the institution called amicus curiae. Amicus curiae 
is literally translated as a friend of the Court. Many dictionaries define this term in a slightly 
different manner. Nevertheless, the essence of the definition is usually the same. For instance, 
the Black’s Law Dictionary defines this term as “[a] person who is not a party to a lawsuit but 
who petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a brief in the action because that 
person has a strong interest in the subject matter”5. Hence, the main objectives of an amicus is 
that it should not be a party to the case and must have interest in the subject matter.  
                                                          
1 P. H. Kooijmans. The Role of Non-State Actors and International Dispute Settlement. – W.P. Heere (ed). From 
Government to Governance. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2004, p 21. 
2 G. K. Rosendal. The Convention on Biological Diversity and Developing Countries. Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 2000, p 93 et seq. 
3 C. P. Cohen. The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Drafting of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. - Human Rights Quarterly Vol 12, No 1, February 1990, p 139 et seq. 
4 E. A. Posner. The Twilight of Human Rights Law. Oxford University Press 2014, p 82.  
5 B. A. Garner. Black's Law Dictionary. 8th edition, 2004, p 93. 
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Moreover, that raises the question as to which institutions and under which circumstances amici 
are allowed. Therefore, the aim of the current thesis is to investigate if INGOs can participate 
as amicus curiae, if the answer is affirmative then under which conditions and why are NGOs 
allowed to participate as amicus curiae? Furthermore, in the cases where amici curiae have 
been allowed, this master’s thesis will investigate whether amicus briefs by NGOs have helped 
courts in deciding the case and if the briefs are taken into account in the first place. 
The current thesis originates from two hypothesises. Firstly, there are no common rules in 
different institutions regarding NGO amicus curiae participation. Secondly, the author of the 
current thesis assumes that amici has an impact on the judgments and are taken into account. 
There is no general definition of NGO in international law. The notion NGO refers to the fact 
that NGOs should be outside of governmental influence. However, in reality, many NGOs take 
donations from governments and in some occasions have cooperative status with one (e.g. 
World Widelife Fund6). Therefore, they are not completely independent from governmental 
influences. If one eliminates governmental funding factor, there would not be left many NGOs 
to analyse. Therefore, in this thesis NGOs are considered as organisations that are established 
by private initiative and do not aim to make profit.  
The current thesis is innovative in the researched field. Compared to other conducted studies 
on the same topic, this thesis is investigating specifically in depth of amicus curiae 
participation. Many other studies focus on the NGO legal status in the international law and 
therefore give only a brief essential overview of amici participation. In addition, this thesis 
gives new perspectives that the author of the current thesis have not come across in previous 
analysises. Furthermore, this thesis goes further into the practice and investigates only certain 
institutions from the NGO amicus curiae participation perspective (excluding locus standi 
participation and other forms of participation in international law). In addition, it provides more 
recent perspectives on the issue. Moreover, the selection of the case examples is novel regarding 
the papers written on the matter before the current thesis. For example, under the current thesis 
chapter about the amici participation in ECtHR, the thesis analyses NGO participation in the 
Delfi vs Estonia case7, which is one of the most far reaching cases for Estonia in the 
international field. 
                                                          
6 Homepage of the World Widelife Fund. Financial info.  
Available online: http://www.worldwildlife.org/about/financials (27.04.2016).;  
Homepage of World Wide Fund for Nature. Our donors and partners.  
Available online: http://www.wwf.eu/about_us/donors_and_partners/ (27.04.2016). 
7 ECtHR 64569/09, 16 June 2015, Delfi vs Estonia. 
6 
 
In order to gain answers to the questions the current thesis aims to solve, different methods are 
to be used. The primarily utilised methods can be categorised into four different types. Firstly, 
regarding the evolution of the provisions and establishing an amicus curiae participation, the 
historical development of law and court practice will be analysed. It is necessary to establish 
the roots of the provison and thus the initial source of amicus curiae participation. That will 
give an insight to the essence of the provisions. Secondly, based on the detailed court cases, the 
current thesis aims to find some general guidelines and tendencies regarding NGOs. Thus, the 
inductive method is applied. Thirdly, in order to be able to draw some general guidelines about 
amicus curiae participation, this thesis will empirically study the experiences of courts and their 
general practices. Finally, the thesis will compare different institutions and systems by applying 
the comparative method. It is necessary in order to draw a general conclusion and highlight 
similarities and differences in the NGO participation as amici in different judicial and quasi-
judicial institutions. 
The current thesis is going to analyse the practices of the three types of international courts. 
Furthermore, some of them are State-centric in their nature and some of them protect directly 
the interest of individuals or the public as whole. That was the main reason for choosing these 
institutions. This gives the current thesis the opportunity to investigate general guidelines and 
tendencies regarding NGO participation in international law as a whole. Moreover, in the 
current thesis state-centric institutions have been deliberately chosen. While both being state-
centric in their nature, they have quite different views regarding NGO amicus curiae 
participation. Further, there is one type of institution that safeguards individual rights and the 
other type that safeguards the public interest by prosecuting perpetrators. In the current thesis, 
the regional human rights courts are viewd to be a subcategory of international courts. The 
analysed institutions are the ICJ (also including its predecessor the PCIJ), the WTO, the ICC, 
the international criminal tribunals (analysed tribunals include the ICTY and the SCSL), the 
ECHR and the IACHR.  
The structure of the current thesis is established mainly by the categories of the chosen 
institutions. The first section of the current thesis gives a general overview and introduction to 
the heated debate in the international field from a more theoretical viewpoint. A further three 
paragraphs empirically investigate the respective chosen institutions categorised by their nature. 
The first are the state-centric ICJ and the WTO. In this chapter, the ICJ’s contentious and 
advisory cases will be analysed. As there are two legal grounds for participating in contentious 
proceedings as amicus curiae, they will both be discussed. Further WTO practice and the basis 
of amicus curiae will be analysed separately in the Panel Proceedings and Appellate Body 
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Proceedings. In the next main chapter, international criminal proceedings will be examined. 
The author will analyse here the ICC, the ICTY and the SCSL. The ICTR has been excluded, 
since the rules and procedures are similar to the ICTY, therefore there is no reason to mention 
it twice. In addition, the ICTY was established before the ICTR.  A further chapter investigates 
the field of the regional protection of human rights, through the ECtHR and the IAcHR. Under 
the IAcHR, two different types of proceedings are to be analysed, since the practice and legal 
basis are not the same.   
The main bibliography contains the Statutes of the Courts and institutions and their rules of 
procedure, since these are the principal legal grounds for amicus curiae participation. Further, 
the respective judicial settlement bodies practice is to be regarded since that establishes the 
general guidelines and tendencies in amicus curiae participation. The chapter on WTO is based 
on a previous analysis that the author of the current thesis did during the University of Tartu’s 
course “International Courts and Tribunals”. The aim of the analysis was to elaborate further 
on the master’s thesis topic. The current analysis about WTO compared to previously done 
analysis gives a new perspective to issues and goes further in the examination of the practise. 
The current thesis will also be illustrated by some of the most highly qualified legal scholars’ 
opinions and criticism. These mentioned scholars are for example Dinah Shelton, Judge 
Kooijmans, Shabtai Rosanne, Judge Jennings and Antonio Cassese.  
The Estonian Subject Thesaurus provides the following keywords that characterise this thesis: 
non-state actors, non-governmental organisations, international courts of law and public 
international law.   
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1. Theoretical Perspective on the Subjects of International Law 
1.1. Subjects of International Law: Then and Now 
The inter-State model of normative order was introduced in 1648, during the Peace of 
Westphalia.8 After this, States were considered subjects of international law and individuals 
only as its objects.9 From that point on, the States have lead the international arena. However, 
it cannot be forgotten that at least in democratic States governments operate by virtue of the 
will of individuals and the individuals are, therefore, authorities of the ultimate source. It is, 
however, so firmly rooted in international law that people think of the state as the ultimate 
authority and sole actor.10  
Moreover, some lawyers see States as the dominant (or sole) lawmakers and the primary 
subjects of international law. However, according to policy-oriented jurisprudence, individuals 
are the ultimate actor of world policy processes, however, states are the dominant actors. This 
characterises the “global process of effective power”, where the major participant is the nation-
state, although the power of many “functional groups” is increasing.11 That suggests clearly to 
the tendencies occurring in the international arena. Mainly that what used to be the situation 
before, may not be anymore the case. 
In the current era, international law is characterised by processes of globalisation. That means 
that the relationships between the state and society as well as between different states and 
societies are transforming.12 Changes can be noticed for instance if one compares the Soviet 
attitudes and Russia’s current relations to international law. Initially, Soviet scholars were 
against the idea of accepting international organisations as subjects of international law.13 
Moreover, the statists accepted international governmental organisations as subjects of 
international law, but remained faithful to emphasizing the role of states. Nevertheless, now 
some scholars in Russia argue that human beings, NGOs and transnational corporations should 
be recognized as subjects of international law.14 Thus, it can be seen that even though the 
                                                          
8 R. Falk. The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conception of International Legal Order. – R. Falk., C. Black 
(ed). The Future of International Legal Order. Vol 1. Princeton University Press 1969, p 43. 
9 P. C. Jessup. A Modern Law of Nations: an introduction. The Macmillan Company New York 1948, p 15.  
10 P. C. Jessup, p 18.  
11 A.-K. Lindblom. Non-Governmental Organisations in International Law. Cambridge University Press 2005, p 
111.  
12 A.-K. Lindblom. The Legal Status of Non-Governmental Organisations in International Law. Uppsala 
Universitet 2001, p 19. 
13 A. Ya. Kapustin. „Kontseptsia mezhdunarodnoi organizatsii. Sovremennye tendentsii i protivorechivye 
tolkovania“ - V. S. Bakhin (ed). Mezhdunarodnoe publichnoe i chastnoe pravo. Problemy i perspektivy. St 
Petersburg: St Petersburg State University 2007, p 97. 
14 L. Mälksoo. Russian Approaches to International Law. Oxford 2015, p 104.  
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Russian legal opinion emphasizes state sovereignity as a high value, it has become a little bit 
more flexible in time regarding the subjects of international law. 
One difference between Western and Russian scholarship is that the first one is inclusive of 
individuals and non-state actors in becoming predominant, while statists tend to dominate in 
the Russian debate.15 Furthermore, Shaw has found that increased participation and personality 
in international law is especially relevant in the field of human rights law, the law relating to 
armed conflicts and international economic law.16 These fields are most interesting to the non-
state actors. For instance, many NGOs are interested in having an impact in the protection of 
human rights (e.g. Amnesty International) or helping victims of armed conflicts such as 
wouded, civilians, non-combatants (e.g. the International Committee of the Red Cross). Thus, 
globalisation can be seen strongly in these fields. 
It can be concluded that for today’s international law, it has a wide range of participants. These 
include inter alia states, international organisations, regional organisations, non-governmental 
organisations, public companies, private companies and individuals.17  
Not only legal scholars acknowledge a wider range of participants. For instance, in the case of 
La Grand, the ICJ also concluded that nowadays individuals have become subjects of 
international law.18 In the case of Reparations for Injuries, the ICJ concluded that the 
organisation of the UN is an international person. Furthermore, the Court explained in the 
matter that the organisation is a subject of international law and capable of posessing 
international rights and obligations, also it has a capacity to maintain its rights by bringing 
international claims in front of the ICJ. However, the Court emphasises that this does not mean 
that the organisation is on the same level as a State. It is certainly not the case.19 Further, 
business actors have stepped foot into the international arena, mainly through investor-state 
arbitrations that follow from multilateral investment treaties and BITs.20 Thus, the international 
arena has become more diverse than it was before. 
Not regarding the increasing range of actors and participants in the international legal system, 
States remain important legal persons. Furthermore, States retain their attraction as the primary 
                                                          
15 L. Mälksoo, pp 105-106. 
16 M. N. Shaw. International Law. 6th edition. Cambridge 2008, p 197. 
17 M. N. Shaw, p 196. 
18 ICJ, 27. June 2001, LaGrand (Germany vs United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, p 466.  
19 ICJ, 11. April 1949, Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports 1949, p 174, p 179. 
20 J. Klabbers, A. Peters, G. Ulfstein. The Constitutionalization of International Law. Oxford University Press 
2011, p 258.  
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focus of the social activity of humankind and thus of international law, notwithstanding 
globalisation and all that this entails.21 Thus, the current analysis does not suggest that States 
are not important actors in the field of international law, but that they are not the only ones that 
contribute to the development and interpretation of the field. There are many different actors of 
which NGOs will be discussed further in detail. 
Although, it has been viewed that an NGO enjoys legal personality in municipal law22, in the 
late 1980s, there have been attempts to give NGOs legal status in the international law field. 
For instance, Marcel stated that giving NGOs legal status would be one solution in order to fill 
the gaps arising from the various national provisions juxtaposition and strengthen the position 
of the NGOs vis-à-vis the inter-governmental organisations. This would guarantee NGOs 
minimum rights and freedom of action vis-à-vis the various national or international 
authorities.23 Another suggestion was made by Sir Dudley Smith to give European NGOs legal 
status.24  
Nowadays NGOs play an increasingly important role on the international and national arena. 
From the social perspective, NGOs have been proven beneficial. NGOs can promote 
democratical aspects and countries’ developments. However, they need support to do so. For 
example, in the case of Bangladesh, the NGOs have been credited with the capability to give 
value to the country’s development progress. The lack of support, however, has resulted in such 
NGOs being in a minority and not that powerful in exerting an influence. This has resulted in 
Bangladesh being left with a paradox: the country has made great progress on the reduction of 
poverty and social development but, on the contrary, it has failed to achieve basic levels of 
integrity and accountability in public life.25 This case shows explicitly what role NGOs can play 
in the development and what there is to gain from them. NGOs have also been beneficial from 
an environmental perspective. For instance, from the viewpoint of the conservation of 
biodiversity in wetland, NGOs have been useful in raising greater awareness of the 
conservational necessities and in educating the public on wetlands conservation and 
                                                          
21 M. N. Shaw, p 197. 
22 K. Martens. Examining the (Non-)Status of NGOs in International Law. - Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies Vol 10, Issue 2, Summer 2003, p 1. 
23 M. Marcel. International Non-governmental Organizations and their Legal Status. – Union of International 
Associations. Commentaries on Legal Status of International Non-Governmental Associations. International 
Associations Statutes Series. sine loco, 1988. Available online: http://www.uia.org/archive/legal-status-3-5 
(16.04.2016).  
24 D. Smith. Non-Governmental Associations. Legal Status of International Non-Governmental Organizations in 
Europe. – Union of International Studies. Commentaries on Legal Status of International Non-Governmental 
Associations. International Association Statutes Series. sine loco, 1988.  
Available online: http://www.uia.org/archive/legal-status-3-6 (16.04.2016).  
25 N. Kabeer, S. Mahmud, J. G. Isaza Castro. NGOs and the Political Empowerment of Poor People in Rural 
Bangladesh: Cultivating the Habits of Democracy? - World Development Vol 40, Issue 10, October 2012, p 2061. 
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management issues. Furthermore, it was found in this conservation case that NGOs’ roles 
should be encouraged and supported by governments. 26 NGOs have also had an impact in the 
protection of global public interests by protecting biodiversity. 
Furthermore, due to the representation of global civil society, NGOs are important members in 
the international community.27 In earlier times, NGOs were characterised as observers or as 
possessing consultative status, now they are regarded more as partners.28 Furthemore, in 2003 
the Council of Europe provided for a possibility for INGOs to acquire participatory status in 
the organisation.29 The preamble of the Resolution on participatory status for international non-
governmental organisations with the Council of Europe stipulates that an active civil society 
and its NGOs are essential to European society and democracy.30 In the United States, NGOs 
have been given cooperative status.31 Thus, it is clear that in recent decades NGOs’ status in 
the international legal arena has grown.  
Moreover, NGOs have also participated in international law-making in different ways: firstly, 
in an informal way, e.g. through lobby work at inter-governmental conferences;32 secondly, by 
participating in secondary law making for the implementation of the respective regimes.33 Thus, 
NGOs are able to give their input into international treaties. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that alongside the NGOs, States still have a power in treaty making. However, if one considers, 
following democratic theory, that individuals are ultimate power and States are dominate 
power, then State gains its authority from its people. Meaning the governments have to consider 
their peoples’ wishes. Meanwhile NGOs have to do the same with their members, who are often 
also individuals. Overall, it seems that both are dependent in a way from individuals. Thus, it 
seems unreasoned to exclude NGOs from the actor status in international law if in a large sense 
                                                          
26 I. Ibrahim, N. A. Aziz. The Roles of International NGOs in the Conservation of Bio-Diversity of Wetlands. – 
Procedia: Social and Behavioral Sciences Vol 42, 2012, p 247. 
27 J. Klabbers, A. Peters, G. Ulfstein, p 219. 
28 J. Klabbers, A. Peters, G. Ulfstein, p 221. 
29 Committee of Ministers. Res(2003)8, 19 November 2003. Participatory status for international non-
governmental organisations with the Council of Europe.  
Available online: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&Ref=Res(2003)8&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=CM&BackC
olorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864&direct=true (24.04.16). 
30 Committee of Ministers. Res(2003)8, 19 November 2003. Participatory status for international non-
governmental organisations with the Council of Europe.  
Available online: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&Ref=Res(2003)8&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=CM&BackC
olorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864&direct=true (24.04.2016). 
31 Permanent Council of the Organization of American States. CP/CAJP-962/94. Non-Governmental 
Organizations with which the Organization of American States has Established Cooperative Relations. Available 
online: http://www.oas.org/en/ser/dia/civil_society/Status.shtml (24.04.2016). 
32 J. Klabbers, A. Peters, G. Ulfstein, p 225. 
33 J. Klabbers, A. Peters, G. Ulfstein, p 225. 
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State power and NGO power comes from the same ultimate source. Despite that NGOs are 
sometimes limited to participate in the international arena.  Nevertheless, NGOs are persistant 
to participate. For example, even if NGOs are unable to access international treaty making, they 
find another way. For instance, they have sought to contribute by drafting or publishing codes 
of conduct, guidelines, interpretive commentaries to treaties etc34.  
Furthermore, the great amount of donations to INGOs shows that the international community 
is supporting NGO’s persistence to participate in the international arena. For instance, in 2014, 
Amnesty International received 247 million euros in donations. Individuals made up 74% (183 
million) of the donations. There is no governmental support for Amnesty International.35 The 
World Wildlife Fund received 98 million dollars in donations from individuals, which is 34% 
of its total income. It also received support from governments: 48 million dollars, which is 17% 
of its total income.36 That shows explicitly that civil society itself supports INGOs’ activities. 
Even States do so on some occasions.  
There now exists no customary rule providing for NGO participation in legal processes37, 
however NGOs have also played their role in law-enforcement. One way they have done so is 
through amicus curiae status.38 This will be further discussed in the forthcoming chapters. 
In conclusion, it is evident from the current chapter that a strictly inter-State centric world view 
is not prevalent anymore. During the Westphalian times, the States might have been the most 
important or the sole actors in international law, however in the contemporary globalised world 
that is not entirely true anymore. Many other actors have entered the arena, which have their 
impact in international law and upon the international community. Thus, the circle of 
participants in international law has widened. Nevertheless, it is wrong to conclude that States 
have abolished their role. They still influence international law enormlously, but not solely.  
1.2. Amicus Curiae - Threat or Benefit?  
It is common that various interests affect different actors other than parties. For instance, 
interests in economic values, natural resources or human rights protection.39 In addition, 
notwithstanding the private and public interests in the outcome of the proceedings, the court 
                                                          
34 A. Boyle, C. Chinkin. The Making of International Law. Oxford University Press 2007, pp 88-89. 
35 Homepage of the Amnesty International. Global financial report 2014.  
Available online: https://www.amnesty.org/en/2014-global-financial-report/ (25.04.2016). 
36 Homepage of theWorld Widelife Fund. Financial info.  
Available online: http://www.worldwildlife.org/about/financials (25.04.2016). 
37 J. Klabbers, A. Peters, G. Ulfstein, p 223. 
38 J. Klabbers, A. Peters, G. Ulfstein, p 229. 
39 A.-K. Lindblom 2001, p 283. 
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has an interest to access the fullest information possible on the matter.40 That is where amici 
curiae can be beneficial. For example, it has been viewed that in nowadays technical world, 
amici can provide the court with the technical support that is highly valued.41 However, there 
remain many counter-arguments for allowing amici participation. That is why this chapter will 
further discuss the advantages and disadvantages of NGO amicus curiae participation. 
As can be seen from the previous chapter, States are not the sole actors in the international 
community. NGOs also have a great impact upon and contribution towards international law.42 
Furthermore, INGOs are seen as the most prolific in interpreting international law.43 They have 
been found to be particularly remarkable in the circumstances where the protection of collective 
interests is at stake.44 In academic writings, it has been observed that NGOs’ efforts to be 
involved in proceedings concern the issues related to human rights, environmental law and 
humanitarian law.45 Furthermore, NGOs have been active as amici curiae in the regional human 
rights systems of the America and in Europe.46 Hence, NGOs have expertise in a specific field 
that they deal with daily. Therefore, their submission comes from their experience. Judges are 
not experts and professionals in every possible issue that might arise during the proceedings. 
Furthermore, it is not reasonable to demand this from them. More technically speaking, 
information furnished by NGOs contributes to better informed and more acceptable 
judgments.47 Thus, in some aspects INGOs might be helpful.  
Since INGOs are also important players in the enforcement of international law48, they are the 
best actors to help the court. The best example of this function is in environmental law.49 
Powerful environmental NGOs pressure society to apprise environmental values and to think 
about future generations. Furthermore, it has been viewed that in the international system, the 
state is losing its formerly dominant position, while other organisations representing 
                                                          
40 A.-K. Lindblom 2001, p 284. 
41 L. Vierucci. NGOs before international courts and tribunals. – P. M. Dupuy, L. Vierucci (ed). NGOs in 
International Law: effeciency in flexibility? E. Elgar 2008, p 165. 
42 P.- M. Dupuy. Art 34/5. – A. Zimmermann (ed). The Statute of International Court of Justice: A Commentary. 
Oxford University Press 2006.; R.Y. Jennings. The International Court of Justice after Fifty Years. - The American 
Journal of International Law Vol 89, No 3, July 1995, p 504.; S. Santivasa. The NGOs’ Participation in the 
Proceedings of the International Court of Justice. – Journal of East Asia & International Law Vol 5, Issue 2, 
September 2012, p 402. 
43 S. Charnovitz. Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law. - The American Journal of International 
Law Vol 100, No 2, April 2006, p 352. 
44 S. Santivasa, p 406. 
45 S. Santivasa, p 400. 
46 K. Nowrot. Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental Organizations Under 
International Law. - Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol 6, Issue 2, Spring 1999, pp 631-632. 
47 J. Klabbers, A. Peters, G. Ulfstein, p 231. 
48 S. Hobe. Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of Nongovernmental Organizations. 
- Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol 5, Issue 1, Fall 1997, p 205. 
49 S. Hobe, p 205. 
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community interests are becoming increasingly important.50 On the other hand, Kamminga has 
emphasised that NGOs have no capacity like States to address all relevant interests.51 
Kamminga has made a good point. INGOs legal capacity and status in the contemporary 
international law is debatable. INGOs are not experts in every field, but they are specialised in 
some specific questions. That is their value in front of the State. Furthermore, States might not 
always be interested in bringing up all the relevant interests in the case. Especially when these 
interests do not support their position or are threat to their power.  
Moreover, INGOs as actors in international civil society are a force for democratizing 
international relations and international institutions. They are the authoritative bearers of world 
opinion. Hence, they can be viewed as the representatives of people in the international arena, 
in a way in which their states, even democratic states, and their state representatives are not. 
The reason for this is that NGOs cannot exist without social acceptance and funding.52 Thus, in 
order to gain acceptance and therewith the funding, NGOs must take into account the societies’ 
values and opinions to some extent. In establishing the objectives of INGOs and planning their 
activities, they take into consideration these values in a generalised form. Otherwise, they risk 
having no future.  
Looking at Amnesty International and the World Wildlife Fund’s funding, it is evident that 
society values the work of such INGOs. Furthermore, the majority of INGO members are 
interested individuals themselves53, who are gathered together to safeguard and develop certain 
values. For example, behind Amnesty International, 7 million people fight against injustice and 
human rights violations.54 Behind the World Wildlife Fund, 5 million people fight globally for 
natural conservation.55 Since the members of INGOs are different individuals from different 
countries, they can be regarded as a world opinion in a way States cannot. States do not have 
such diverse membership. INGOs, therefore, have authenticity, legitimacy and the authority of 
the people that states do not have. Thus, in short, NGOs should have a seat at the table of power 
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for these reasons56, since they can provide a common platform for diversity.57 On the other 
hand, the NGOs’ funders are the Western rich people, who might not always represent the 
interests of developing area people. Furthermore, the interest of developing countries is not 
always equivalent with the West. 
Based on NGOs’ ability to provide common diverse platform, sometimes NGOs have been seen 
as neutral regarding different interests, sectors of society and objectives.58 This is not always a 
correct assumption. There are many INGOs that specialise in certain issues (e.g. Human Rights 
Watch deals with human right issues, the World Wildlife Fund deals with natural conservation). 
They do not deal with a wide range of issues. Probably one of the most severe threats of NGO 
amicus participation is that the powerful NGOs might circumvent the law when they want to 
achieve their objectives.  For instance, this was the case with Greenpeace, which boycotted the 
Shell Oil Company in order to put pressure on the firm to withdraw its planned dumping of an 
oil platform into the North Sea.59 Therefore, NGOs cannot always be regarded as neutral or as 
safeguarding societal values.  
Furthermore, legal academics have considered that the exclusion of NGOs from international 
proceedings (especially in the case of the ICJ) is based on considerations of expediency rather 
than law.60 The caseload that comes with NGO amicus participation will definitely increase in 
the Courts. Moreover, such participation will require more resources, e.g. mostly time and 
money. Nevertheless, in United States, where amici are often used, has been found that allowing 
amici curiae to give its expert opinion in the proceedings is the most cost-effective way.61 In a 
way it is true. If one has amici in the proceedings to elaborate on the topic, it does not need a 
further assistance from other experts on the same topic. However, the question remains whether 
amici is being unbiased. 
In addition, allowing NGOs to submit briefs may make some States more reluctant to submit 
disputes to it. States may be averse to NGOs being involved in a bilateral dispute, in particular 
if the views presented are not to their liking. This argument certainly should not be taken lightly, 
although it should be noted that it would not apply to advisory proceedings.62 This view reflects 
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the question of the power of States. They want to be in charge; however, letting non-state actors 
participate in the proceedings will render the outcome for States more blurry. Thus, this will 
take away, in some way, States power in their view.  
Furthemore, since the actual decision-making power in international law lies with States, they 
have to decide whether non-state actors can contribute to international dispute settlements. For 
instance, States helped to develop the ICC Rules of Evidence and Proceedure and to a lesser 
extent in the development of the ICTY and ICTR Rules.63 Bartholomeusz concluded that since 
the States themselves were interested in providing for a procedure regarding amicus curiae 
participation in the named rules, it is possible to conclude that in these dispute settlement 
proceedings, amici are valuable.64 Hence, even if it is clear that NGO amici are allowed to 
participate in these proceedings, it can be further concluded that the initial permission for their 
participation relies on States’ willingness even if the the Court has the discretional power to 
decide whether to approve or reject the request to leave a grant to submit an amicus curiae brief. 
Contrary to this view, Judge Koolijmas agreed with Shelton in saying that in the case of human 
rights tribunals, where amici usually do not express support for the defendant State’s position 
but are opposed to it, there has hardly been any opposition by States to the admission of amicus 
briefs.65 The author of this thesis is on the opinion of that this might be influenced by the state’s 
wish to maintain their reputation in the international field. They do not like to be seen as against 
greater good or against protection of human rights. If democratic states do not aim for human 
rights protection and therefore greater justice, they will be judged by other states. Thus, in a 
long perspective, they might lose their reputation in the eyes of other states.    
Every argument about who is and ought to be recognized as a subject of international law is 
underpinned by a normative vision of what makes international law legitimate and what purpose 
should be served by it (peace, justice, order etc).66 What happens if States are not interested in 
the matter and therefore do not address it (however, the matters can be influential for a small 
group of people, i.e. minorities) in the proceedings? Amici has been viewed as a way to represent 
the public interest that has not brought up by anyone else in the case.67 Adopting Ottawa 
Convention on banning landmines for example higlights the issue:  
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“Governments were initially entirely uninterested; it was regarded by governments everywhere 
as pie-in-the-sky, even if they were not actively hostile to the idea.”68 Governments eventually 
began to come on board the landmines ban cause for three principal reasons. NGO pressure, 
first, brought them to an awareness of the genuine extent of the problem and put it on their 
policy agendas.69 /…/ NGOs are actively promoting the protection of human rights in areas 
beyond State control. A telling example is the important role that NGOs play in the battle 
against child pornography on the Internet.” 70 
Hence, when States are not interested, the NGOs can play important role in highlighting the 
issues. By that, the NGOs contribute to the problem solving. Therefore, some important issues 
will not be left without the needed attention.  
The aim of NGO amicus curiae participation has been considered to be the promotion of 
transparency and the legitimacy of the international process71 and a further contribution to 
general transparency72. Society has a possibility to give its opinion in the matter by way of 
INGOs. Thus, it improves communication between the Court and the international 
community.73 The Court will have an input from society, which means that the result is more 
practical than theoretical. Even if NGO participation cannot make international law democratic, 
it can to some extent contribute to strengthening its legitimacy.74 Co-operation with NGOs also 
helps to bring information and expertise into intergovernmental fora and inform the public of 
decisions taken there.75 However, it is evident that the question of what type of participation 
and which NGOs should be entitled to participate should be regulated by international law.76  
On the contrary, several procedural principles would be put in danger. First of all, it has been 
considered that judges are the ultimate guardians of justice, thus they can ensure a fair trial 
without the assistance of amici curiae.77 From this perspective it can be summarized that NGOs 
cannot possibly have anything additional to bring to the Court that concerns the law. 
Furthermore, may be they should not, since it might shift the powers in the litigation. Since 
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participation of the amici might create structural inequality. For example in the case of ICC, 
where there are already 3 parties in the pleadings (additional party is the victims’ 
representatives) and amici protects the right by arguments that do not differ in its essence from 
the prosecutors’ arguments. Therefore, the necessity to include NGOs as amici curiae to add a 
valuable element of justice seems unreasoned when the judges themselves are professionals and 
independent. Furthermore, taking into consideration the fact that this principle has been found 
to play a continuously important role in international dispute settlement78 and adding to it that 
in some cases the ECHR, the ICTY and the ICTR have permitted amicus intervention on legal 
issues that are in the judge’s competence79, it is clear that the principle juria novit curiae is 
violated. The ground principles of the trial should be followed in order to guarantee a fair trial. 
In addition to the juria novit curiae principle, the equality of arms and parties autonomy may 
be endangered due to the fact that an amicus does not have to prove the veracity of their brief.80 
The rights are the basis of the fair trial, therefore such a threat is a serious intervention in 
guaranteeing a fair trial. Therefore, in the case of the amicus submission benefitting one party, 
the evidence is stronger but not proven in the ordinary sense of the procedural requirements and 
rules. Furthermore, the value of unproven submissions is controversial. It is also possible that 
NGOs will abuse their amici curiae submissions; in cases where they have their own agendas 
at stake. That is also supported by the sometimes expressed view that NGOs are self-appointed, 
single-issue-oriented and often not accountable to the people on whose behalf they claim to 
speak.81 Thus, if they are not accountable, they have nothing to lose by abusing their amicus 
curiae status. However, in terms of the proceedings, such behaviour might lead to significant 
changes in the final judgment. That will definitely not result in more valuable elements of 
justice. Nevertheless, as stated above, if NGOs want to remain their fundings, they have to 
follow some values supported by their donors. Otherwise, they would risk to have no future.  
In conclusion, it can be seen that there are many benefits to the amicus curiae participation. 
They are able to contribute to more just outcomes of the proceedings. Furthermore, the INGOs 
are usally more diverse in their memberships than States. Thus, they represent the opinions of 
the civil society. Nevertheless, there are also many threats to amici participation. One cannot 
be sure if the NGOs are biased or not. Notwithstanding, amici participation might have a serious 
threats to the principles of the fair trial, e.g. juria novit curiae. Furthermore, States are the actual 
decision makers in the international law and therefore, allowing amicus curiae to participate in 
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their proceedings, may make States reluctant to enter their cases in the international courts. 
Especially, in case of state-cenrtic courts. However, the concret threats depend on the cases and 
NGOs that want to participate.  
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2. State-Centric Court Proceedings 
2.1. Permanent Court of International Justice and International Court of Justice  
2.1.1. Contentious cases 
2.1.1.1. Amicus Curiae as “Public International Organisation” 
ICJ Statute Art 30 (1) gives the Court right to frame its rules in order to carry out its functions. 
In particular, the Court has right to lay down rules of procedure.82 However, in establishing its 
rules, the Court has to stay within the limits of the ICJ Statute and its jurisdictional system, 
which is based on State consent.83 Thus, the Court has to take into consideration what States 
think. First, in order to allow amicus curiae participation, States must be on board. 
According to Art 34 (1) of the ICJ Statute, only states may be parties to contentious cases in 
front of the ICJ. There is no explicit right in the rules of procedure nor in the ICJ Statute, which 
allows the participation of amicus curiae.  However, Art 34(2) ICJ Statute provides for an 
exception to sole State participation by stating: “the Court, subject to and in conformity with 
its Rules, may request of public international organizations information relevant to cases before 
it, and shall receive such information presented by such organizations on their own initiative”. 
Therefore, additional to the States, the parties may be also public international organisations in 
a limited manner.  The Statute of the ICJ, however, does not state what a public international 
organisation is. Nevertheless, in this case, the organisation has to have relevant information and 
this organisation shall present the information to the Court of its own initiative.  
Shabtai Rosanne established that “/…/ in a contentious case non-governmental international 
organizations have no access to the Court whatsoever. From the point of view of the procedure 
in contentious cases, they are regarded as individuals.”84 Furthermore, the Statute contains no 
provision by which an individual may be given access to the Court, in the sense that an 
individual, whether a natural or a juridical person, may be a party in a case before the Court or 
may acquire the status of non-party intervener.85 The practice of the Court also does not 
envisage the legal representatives of an individual appearing before the Court, holding briefs, 
receiving copies of the pleadings, and being allowed perhaps as amicus curiae to represent his 
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own case.86 Hence, according to Rosanne, there are no means possible by which individuals 
can participate in the proceedings. The same applies by analogy to NGOs. 
In the practice of the ICJ’s contentious proceedings, the Court has never allowed an NGO to 
participate as amicus curiae. Nevertheless, NGOs have tried to receive leave to submit amicus 
briefs. On the 7th of March in 1950, Robert Delson, a member of the Board of Directors of the 
International League for the Rights of Man, asked the Registrar for the possibility to submit a 
brief from The International League for the Rights of Man as a public international organization 
pursuant to Art 34 of the ICJ Statute in the Asylum case.87 The Registrar declined such a request 
by stating that the International League of Rights of Man cannot be characterized as a public 
international organization as envisaged by the Statute.88 The Registrar gave no further 
explication.89 Hence, from this one can conclude that public international organisations are not 
INGOs and therefore, INGOs should not be considered as amici curiae according to Art 34 ICJ 
Statute. 
Furthermore, Art 69 (4) of the Rules of the Court established that the term “public international 
organization” in Art 34(2) denotes an international organization of States.90 In the NAFTA 
Tribunal in the Methanex case, the tribunal commented, “[The ICJ’s] jurisdiction in contentious 
cases is limited solely to disputes between States; its Statute provides for intervention by States; 
and it would be difficult in these circumstances to infer from its procedural powers a power to 
allow a non-state third person to intervene.”91 Hence, there are no rules under which non-state 
actors can enter the Court. Such a viewpoint is in accordance with the legal instruments and the 
case practice, notwithstanding the standpoints of other judicial UN established inter-state 
judicial settlement bodies, e.g. ITLOS.     
In comparison, ITLOS, which is also a UN established institution like the ICJ, has elaborated 
upon the same kind of question, whether NGOs could be viewed in the tribunal as amicus 
curiae. ITLOS does not mention amicus curiae in its regulation. ITLOS has solved the issue in 
Art 84 (1) of its Rules by emphasing that only intergovernmental organizations can, by the 
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request of a party or proprio motu, furnish information relevant to the case.92 Moreover, Art 84 
(4) of these Rules defines an intergovernmental organisation as an intergovernmental 
organisation other than any organisation which is a party or intervenes in the case concerned.93 
Thus, in its Rules ITLOS already excludes the possibility of an NGO possessing amicus status. 
However, in its practice in the Sunrise Arctic case an NGO, Greenpeace, has for the first time 
made an amicus curiae submission in the context of contentious proceedings.94 The Tribunal 
rejected the submission95, although it was previously sent to the parties to give their opinion of 
the admissibility of the brief96 and resulted in asking Greenpeace to appear at the hearing as a 
witness.97 Hence, from this one can see clearly that even if an inter-state dispute settlement 
body explicitly excludes NGO participating as amicus curiae, it is still possible that inter-state 
bodies, in some cases, find it relevant to hear from NGOs. This might be their way to contribute 
to the overall justice that is in accordance with the aim of establishing the institution of amicus 
curiae.  
Compared to the ICJ, the ITLOS is more precise in its regulation regarding NGO amicus curiae 
participation. The ICJ provision is looser, leaving space for interpretation. Moreover, there is 
no certain definition of public international organisation in the context of ICJ contentious 
proceedings. It can still be regarded from case law that a public international organisation is not 
an NGO in its essence. 
One the other hand, not all agree to this kind of interpretation. Some most highly qualified 
publicists consider Art 34 (2, 3) to be viewed more broadly to encompass “international public 
interest organizations”, seen as those with consultative status to the UN.98 According to this 
definition, Art 34(2) would include any organisation that  aims to deal with and protect the 
public interest. It has been stated in academic writings that NGOs as amicus are efficient in 
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human rights law, environmental law and humanitarian law.99 All these areas protect the 
universal interest. Universal interests are public interests, since they usually aim to improve the 
public well-being rather than protect some specific rights of some small group or a certain State. 
Hence, the INGOs that are aiming to protect human rights, environmental or humanitarian 
rights are international public interest organisations in their essence.  
Furthermore, Shelton found that the ICJ’s institutional interests favour non-governmental 
amicus participation. She stated that even if additional materials are submitted to the Court, 
these materials aim to provide relevant information to the Court, concerning broader issues of 
public interest and legal analysis. This assists the Court in reaching its decision and promotes 
the further development of the law.100 Thus, by helping the Court to reach a just and transparent 
decision, NGOs are useful to the ICJ and through their own goals provide assistance to the 
Court to meet their aims. According to this interpretation, NGOs could be amici curiae in front 
of the ICJ. Nevertheless, there might still be doubts if the State would be willing to broaden 
their disputes to include non-state actors. 
The contrary is the case if one considers the historical interpretation method of the Statute. The 
ICJ Statute is in many aspects the same as the PCIJ Statute and the PCIJ was a predecessor to 
the ICJ. Thus, PCIJ regulation in regarding the issue of NGOs as amici curiae should be taken 
into consideration.  
Art 34 of the PCIJ Statute states, “only States or Members of the League of Nations can be 
parties in cases before the Court.”101 That was the only sentence in this article, there were no 
subparagraphs like in the current ICJ Statute. Therefore, the previous wording of the same 
article was narrower than in the current provision. It gives the party status only to States and to 
the League of Nations. It provides for no possibility to submit NGO briefs. However, the PCIJ 
Statute, in its Art 26, included the possibility for the ILO to submit voluntary information 
concerning labour cases in front of the Court. 
Hence, the ILO was provided with special status in front of the Court. Nevertheless, the ILO is 
an inter-state organisation, not an INGO but it has a relationship to NGOs. Firstly, NGOs have 
regional and general consultative status in ILO.102 Secondly, in addition to the consultative 
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status, ILO integrates NGOs in itself to provide better working conditions. The means for that 
are social dialogue and tripartism.103 
In 1929 during the revision process of the PCIJ Statute, Art 34 was discussed. Judge Francisco 
José Urrutia Olano raised a question considering practical aspects, whether the League of 
Nations should be provided with the right to plead before the Court. During these discussions, 
it was mentioned that the term “only” suggests that only States may be parties, not 
individuals.104 Furthermore, in 2005 the Rules of Court were amended and now Art 69(4) states 
that the term public international organisation denotes an organisation of States.105 
In the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Dam Project case106, some NGOs, such as Fondation Cousteau, 
proposed their help directly to the government of Hungary.107 Afterwards the Hungarian 
government submitted an amicus brief prepared by the INGO World Wildlife Fund.108 This 
NGO brief submitted in the Hungarian memorial has been considered the first amicus brief by 
an NGO that the Court accepted. 109 However, the Hungarian memorials do not mention such 
amicus curiae briefs in the ICJ documentation.110 Furthermore, these NGO contributions cannot 
be considered as amicus curiae briefs by NGOs, since NGOs do not participate in their own 
capacity.111 The author of the current thesis is of the opinion that these NGO aids are merely a 
help to the government and most probably these NGOs never intended to be amicus curiae 
before the ICJ. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that they wanted to give their contribution to the 
issue discussed in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Dam Project case. Moreover, this can be viewed 
as another way of an NGO contributing to international justice without being an amicus curiae 
nor a party to the case. 
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To sum up, it seems that Art 34(2) was and still is not meant for non-state actors, and therefore 
NGO participations are rejected, nor has the Court ever allowed a NGO to participate as amicus 
curiae in the course of contentious proceedings. However, the wording of this provision gives 
a wide area of discretion as to the interpretation. Even though the Rules of Court were amended 
in 2005 and they now establish what the term public international organisation means, the 
interpretational issues remain. In order to avoid interpretational misunderstandigs, the ICJ 
Statute itself should be amended.   
2.1.1.2. Amicus Curiae as “Any Other Organisation” 
An alternative way for an amicus curiae to enter the court’s pleading has been seen via Art 50 
ICJ Statute.112 Moreover, the expert participation necessity under Art 50 has also been advised 
in Court practice: in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case113 and in the Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay case.114 NGOs would be qualified based on their special knowledge to give such 
assistance to the Court. Furthermore, most probably they would be willing to do so. 
Art 50 Statute states: “The Court may, at any time, entrust any individual, body, bureau, 
commission, or other organization that it may select, with the task of carrying out an enquiry or 
giving an expert opinion.” The subject circle in the following article is wide: any individual, 
body, bureau, commission, or other organization. Thus, NGOs are also included. Moreover, 
three aspects seem particularly relevant in order to apply Art 50.115 
Firstly, by using this article, the Court can enjoy a wide margin of discretion.116 However, in 
the opinion of the author of the current thesis, it should be noted that according to the wording 
of the current provision, this provision gives the Court the possibility to invite NGOs to give 
their expertise on the case if neccessary. This provision does not give the possibility to an NGO 
to submit a brief on its own initiative. Therefore, one must consider how loosely or narrowly, 
the term “amicus curiae” should be interpreted. By translating it from Latin to English, it means 
the friend of the court. However, the question regarding the entering remains, since “a friend” 
can be one who is invited and also one who enters by himself. However, usually if one considers 
that an amicus curiae can be an expert, e.g. an NGO, established by the Court and in doing so 
contribute to the case, then it can be that amicus curiae enter to the proceedings in a wider sense 
via Art 50.  
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Nevertheless, compared to Art 34 (2), which reflects the so to say classical view for amicus 
curiae submissions and is in accordance with the definition given previously, to Art 50, it is 
clear that in the last provision there is no “on its own initiative” aspect, since the Court invites 
the NGO as an expert. Likewise, a party may request the participation of an expert according 
to Art 67 (1) of the Rules of Court 117. However, the author of the current thesis recognises that 
this is a way for NGOs to have their impact on international law. However, it is not up to NGOs 
to decide whether to use Art 50 or not. The use of this provision is in the realm of the Court’s 
discretion.  Therefore, it should be not regarded as a way in for amicus curiae. 
Secondly, the procedure governing by Art 50 has to take into account Art 67 (1) of the Rules 
of Court. The named provision foresees that if an enquiry is conducted or an expert opinion 
called upon, then parties have a right to be heard on the matter at hand. Furthermore, after that 
an order to this effect is given with specific further guidelines.118 This provision gives two 
opportunities: appoint the experts directly or set out the procedure by which they are 
appointed.119 Furthermore, by hearing the parties out, the parties have a right to object to the 
appointing of an expert. Therefore, depending on the states’ willingness, NGOs might or might 
not get to the Court. Probably, it is highly dependent on many factors. Nevertheless, through 
this, States give their input and the Court does not have to worry about the willingness of the 
State to engage non-state actors in the proceedings. 
Thirdly, considerations about the status of experts or persons carrying out enquiries have to be 
taken into account. Pursuant to the GA Res. 90 (I) of 11 December 1946 Art 5 (a) (iii) witnesses, 
experts and persons performing missions by order of the Court in conducting their mission have 
a right to enjoy the privileges and immunities provided for in Art VI section 22 Convention on 
the privileges and immunities of the UN.120  
Furthermore, Art 50 does not prescribe for evidential value being attached to expert opinions 
or enquiries. Thus, the Court is free to assess the importance of the given information in terms 
of law.121 Hence, regarding this provision the real value of the amicus curiae is not certain. It 
is up to the Court to decide the value of the expertise in every separate case. Nevertheless, Art 
50 has proven to be effective in cases involving complex technical, scientific or other issues 
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beyond the judges’ expertise.122 This opportunity has been used in the Corfu Channel case in 
order to verify the facts and solve the question of States’ responsibility123 and in the Gulf of 
Maine case to assist in the delimitation of the maritime boundary.124 
There is some debate as to whether Art 50 can be used also in advisory proceedings. The PCIJ 
considered the function in the context of the Court’s advisory proceedings and found that: “The 
Court does not say that there is an absolute rule that the request for an advisory opinion may 
not involve some enquiry as to facts, but, under ordinary circumstances, it is certainly expedient 
that the facts upon which the opinion of the Court is desired should not be in controversy”.125  
Furthermore, Art 68 ICJ Statute states that in the advisory functions the Court is guided by the 
provisions of the ICJ Statute that apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes 
them to be applicable.126 Therefore, it is evident that the Court may rely on the contentious 
proceedings’ rules in advisory proceedings if appropriate.  
In the Western Sahara case, Judge de Castro in his Separate opinion concluded, “even if Article 
68 of the Statute is interpreted in the broadest manner, it would not seem that in advisory 
proceedings the Court is entitled to make arrangements connected with the taking of evidence 
(Statute, Art. 48) or to entrust anyone with the task of carrying out an enquiry or giving an 
expert opinion (Statute, Art. 50) ”.127 He explained it as follows, nowadays, when advisory 
opinions’ case facts are disputed or controversial, the Court is not competent to decide upon the 
issue. Mainly this is the case, since the Court cannot satisfy itself with such evidence. 
Furthermore, the Court can collaborate with the requesting body only when the Court itself has 
verified facts’ accuracy. It is the Court’s responsibility to verify the factual data on which the 
opinion will be based. Further the Judge found that the means for conducting an investigation 
is not provided to the Court.128 Thus, he was concerned with the Court not having the 
competence to do it.  Nevertheless, it seems to the author of the current thesis that Art 50 may 
be on the contrary helpful in that context to establish the uncertainties of advisory proceedings. 
Therefore, having an expert verifying anomalies, will increase the quality of the advisory 
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opinion. Academics have concluded that Art 50 is applicable also in the context of advisory 
opinions.129 
Hence, Art 50 ICJ Statute can be viewed as an alternative way for an NGO to enter ICJ 
proceedings as amicus curiae. However, it seems more like a provision for the Court to decide 
if and when additional expert help is needed. It does not give an NGO the possibility to 
intervene on its own initiative. Furthermore, there are two differing opinions as to whether the 
provision is also applicable to advisory proceedings or not.  
2.1.2. Advisory opinions  
In the course of advisory proceedings, the basis for intervention has been seen in Art 66 (4) ICJ 
Statute. The named provision establishes that “the Registrar shall also, by means of a special 
and direct communication, notify any state entitled to appear before the Court or international 
organization considered by the Court, or, should it not be sitting, by the President, as likely to 
be able to furnish information on the question, that the Court will be prepared to receive, within 
a time-limit to be fixed by the President, written statements, or to hear, at a public sitting to be 
held for the purpose, oral statements relating to the question”. Art 66 (2) provides, therefore, 
that the Court decides which State or international organization is “likely to be able to furnish 
information on the question”. In practice, the court has showed an open attitude, both towards 
States and public international organisations. It enjoys great latitude to decide who to invite and 
also when. However, the Court may distinguish between written and oral procedings.130  
Art 66 is less strict than Art 34 (2). It refers to international organisations, not to public 
international organisations. Therefore, the essence of the organisation may vary and it is 
possible to conclude that any international organisation could be a subject of this provision. 
Thus, even an NGO could be entitled to receive such information. Nevertheless, Art 66 in 
practice has the same meaning as Art 34 (2).131  
Essentially, the provision was recreated from Art 73 of the PCIJ Rules of Court and later Art 
66 PCIJ Statute. From the revision process, it is evident that the PCIJ was aware that this 
provision could encompass the participation of NGOs.132  
Anzilotti was reminding others that “Je rappelle ici la Résolution du Conseil du 17 mai 1922. 
En second lieu, ne conviendrait-il pas de définir un peu mieux quelles sont les organisations 
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internationales visées par l'article ? A mon avis, il ne saurait être question que des organes de 
la Société des Nations et des organes créés par une union internationale (Commissions et 
Bureaux internationaux). On se rappellera peut-être que la malheureuse expression 
(organisations internationales) fut adoptée pour ne pas mentionner particulièrement le Bureau 
international du Travail”.133 It is evident from this citation why the wording “international 
organisations” was used: to avoid saying directly that the ILO can give its submissions in the 
course of advisory proceedings concerning labour cases. Furthermore, it is clear that already in 
1922, the term suggested that only organisations of States and States themselves could be 
parties in front of the ICJ. 
Judge Dionisio Anzilotti was concerned that allowing any kind of international organisation to 
submit its views to the Court would be difficult and the Court might find itself in a complex 
situation.  The main reason for this is that an unofficial organisation, in reality, did not incur 
responsibility. Although since the initiative would rest with the Court itself, Judge Anzilotti 
recognized that hypothetically this kind of danger would merely exist. Nevertheless, he was of 
the opinion that Art 50 ICJ Statute sufficed to enable the Court to apply it to private 
organisations capable of supplying useful information when these organisations were offering 
al1 the necessary guarantees.134  It can be further interpreted from his standpoint that Art 66 did 
not need to encompass INGOs. 
The only case where the ICJ has allowed an NGO as amicus curiae in the course of advisory 
proceedings was the case of the International Status of South-West Africa. Concerning the 
named case, the Human Rights League requested in March 1950 to be able to furnish 
information before the Court according to Art 66 (2).135 The Court permitted the Human Rights 
League to give its opinion as amicus curiae in the named case and gave a deadline for such a 
submission.136 However, the submission arrived after the given deadline and therefore, the 
Court could not accept it. Furthermore, the form of the written submission was not acceptable. 
Firstly, there was no reference to the pamphlet enclosed with the same envelope that the letter 
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was sent. Secondly, the pamphlet bore no signature for authentication, only the printed names 
of the International League for the Rights of Man and of several American, British and French 
lawyers, including that of Mr. Robert Delson, who first applied to the Court on the matter.137 
Therefore, it can be seen that the ICJ itself was willing to accept the brief; however, the NGO 
itself missed the chance. 
Nevertheless, in its Rules, the PCIJ permitted the participation of NGOs in several advisory 
proceedings under Art 73 of its Rules.138 Contrary to the ICJ’s practice, the PCIJ has invited 
NGOs representing employers and employees in the ILO to furnish information in more than 
one case.139 Notwithstanding that, the ILO had a special status before the PCIJ pursuant to PCIJ 
Statute Art 26. These cases are noteworthy because the PCIJ asked private entities for their 
observations through the ILO and not the ILO directly. This PCIJ practice might have been a 
consideration behind why the League for the Rights of Man was permitted to submit an amicus 
brief in the legal status of South-West Africa case in the first place. However, the strange aspect 
is that the PCIJ and the ICJ statutes are much alike; both see States as their subjects and not 
NGOs, but the PCIJ allowed private organisations to give their opinions in proceedings more 
than the ICJ. 
In November 1970, the International League of the Rights of Man requested to be permitted to 
furnish information in the case of the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia like the League was authorised to do in the case of South-West 
Africa. Furthermore, the League wanted to be able to hear the oral pleadings.140  The Court 
denied the request.141 After the response, the League requested that only the written statements 
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would be considered.142 The Registrar responded to that by stating the fact that the Court has 
not given leave to written nor oral submissions.143  
It is not known what the real considerations are behind the Court admitting the Human Rights 
League as amicus curiae in the one case and denying it in every other. It could have been that 
there was nothing to say on the matter by NGOs. Nevertheless, it might also be that the ICJ 
learned from the experience and just wanted to avoid the difficulties and complexity. However, 
if that is the case then the consideration to exclude NGOs from participation is not based on 
legal considerations and tendencies in the development of international law. The reasons are 
more selfish. 
Nevertheless, in the same case, other organisations (among them the NGO, American 
Committee on Africa) also tried to submit their written statements, but were all denied.144 On 
13th of November 1970, George M. Houser, the executive director of the American Committee 
on Africa, submitted a request to the Registrar to be able to submit a statement in the matter.  
In the same request, Georg M. Houser referred to the Committee as an affiliate of the 
International League for the Rights of Man.145 The Registrar, in the reply, denied such a request 
due to the American Committee on Africa not being an international organization and therefore 
it cannot exercise the right given in Art 66 (2) ICJ Statute.146   
In its further communication with the Court, the American Committee on Africa stated that it 
“believes that the refusal to accept its statement was unwarranted in law, inconsistent with prior 
practice, and incompatible with the best interests of the Court and of the people of Namibia.”147 
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Incompatibility with the law refers to the case of the international status of South-West Africa. 
Furthermore, the Committee elaborates, “the rejection was unwarranted in law since Article 66 
(2) of the Statute of the Court does not require the rejection of any statement, but merely 
specifies which ones the Court is bound to receive. No reasonable interpretation of the article 
compels the Court to reject valuable "information" merely because the Court was unaware of 
the existence of an organization prepared to present it.”148 “The Committee is informed, 
moreover, that there does not appear to have been any formal communication addressed to the 
United Nations specifying the organizations from which a statement would be received. The 
Committee was aware only of a general notice concerning the request for the advisory opinion 
and the date for submission of statements (later extended by order of the Court): this notice was 
not addressed to any specified list of organizations, and the Committee had no reason to believe 
that any other communication had been sent out by the Court.”149 
The Committee is an international organisation, not affiliated to any government, thus, it is 
capable of bringing an insight to the Court, which no State is likely to present. It is able to set 
forth specific data and to make concrete proposals without concern for domestic repercussions, 
and it has no bureaucratic inhibitions. The Committee believes that it is in the interest of the 
Court and of the people of Namibia that the Court receive formal representations of as broad 
and inclusive a nature as possible on a question of such far-reaching significance as that now 
before the Court.150 On 4th February 1971, the Court notified the Committee that the Court 
endorsed the refusal to accept the Committee’s written statement. 151 The International League 
for the Rights of Man also submitted a request to be able to furnish the information before the 
Court in its written and oral proceedings, and was denied.152 
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It can be seen that concerning other organisations than the League for the Rights of Man, the 
explanation for refusal is the fact that these organisations are not international organisations in 
the sense of Art 66. However, the League on the Rights of Man does not have relevant 
information to give to the cases in which it was refused. That makes the line regarding the term 
“international organisations” blurry.   
Before the adoption of the Practice Directions, the Court received several other requests for 
amicus curiae participation and denied them.153 The great variety of amicus curiae requests led 
to the adoption of the Practice Directions.154 
In 2001 some clarity to this disputed term “public international organisation” with the adoption 
of the Practice Directions was provided. Direction No. XII states the guidelines in the case that 
an INGO submits an amicus brief. In its subsection 1, it foresees that in the case of a submission 
by an INGO occuring in an advisory opinion, it will not be the part of the case file.155 Thus, it 
should be highlighted here that the wording of the practice direction does not forbid submitting 
NGO amicus curiae briefs but just states that they will not be considered in the case file. 
Subsection 3 of the same direction, however, states that these submitted briefs or documents 
will be archived in a designated location in the Peace Palace and all States and engaged 
intergovernmental organisations will be informed about the location of such a brief.156 
Therefore, in case they have an interest, the parties may actually get acquainted with the 
submissions and most probably take them into account in their own submissions and position 
regarding the issues under discussion. The question of whether they are interested to do it or 
not, is however, a separate question. Furthermore, in this case it has to be noted that Practice 
Direction XII gives guidelines only in cases of advisory opinions. It states nothing about 
contentious cases.  
Contrary to its widespread practice, in 2003, the ICJ accepted directly concerned non-state actor 
to present written and oral statements before the Court. The Court has done so by way of 
relatively pragmatic considerations. The Court did not refered to a specific article of ICJ statute 
or of the Rules of the Court.157  
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Hence, the ICJ compared to the PCIJ, is quite restrictive when allowing NGO amicus curiae 
participation. Nevertheless, both Courts are rather more conservative than liberal in granting 
these rights. There remain, however, many questions about the background of refusal decisions, 
since the Court usually did not elaborate on these issues in its responses to requests.  
2.2. World Trade Organisation  
2.2.1. The Panel Proceedings  
The Uruguay round agreement: Art V (2) of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO 
foresees consultation and cooperation with NGOs dealing with matters related to the WTO.158 
Furthermore, the WTO has adopted guidelines for arrangements on relations with NGOs.159 
Nevertheless, there is no provision that explicitly permits the submission of amicus curiae briefs 
by non-members, i.e. non-WTO members, international organisations, NGOs, or natural or 
legal persons in the instruments governing the procedure of the WTO system.160 Furthermore, 
the DSU does not distinguish between NGO and International Organisation participation. 
Nevertheless, the DSU Art 1 (1) states firmly that the dispute procedure applies to WTO 
Member States.161 Thus, according to these rules it seems that NGOs could not be amici in front 
of the WTO DSB. The reason for that is a fact that NGOs are not members of WTO.162 
Regarding the normative interpretation by the Panels and Appellate Body, the case is not that 
simple. 
The WTO Appellate Body in the US-Shrimp case first addressed the issue of NGO participation 
in Panel Proceedings. The case stated that “the thrust of Articles 12 and 13, taken together, is 
that the DSU accords to a panel established by the DSB, and engaged in a dispute settlement 
proceeding, ample and extensive authority to undertake and to control the process by which it 
informs itself both of the relevant facts of the dispute and of the legal norms and principles 
applicable to such facts.” 163 Hence, the Appellate Body views Art 12 and 13 of the DSU as a 
means of amicus curiae participation. According to this interpretation, the DSB has the 
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authority to establish its own process in order to be informed by the relevant facts and legal 
norms applicable to such facts.  
 
Art 13 (1) of the DSU grants each panel the right to seek information and technical advice from 
any individual or body which it deems appropriate. This provision on the subject is quite loose. 
It gives the Panel a large discretion on the matter when choosing the type of advice and from 
whom. “Any individual body” is loose enough to include NGOs. In addition, the type of advice 
is quite large – information and technical advice. Moreover, the Appellate Body has explained 
that it is of the opinion that the word “seek” from Art 13 of the DSU can be read more broadly 
than in a strict manner.164 Furthermore, from Art 13 (1), it is clear that amicus brief submissions 
are decidable case by case. All the benefits from the submissions have to be considered and 
evaluated before granting the leave or prohibiting the NGO participation, taking into 
consideration the complexity of the case. Although, there can be a right for an NGO to submit 
the brief, the Appellate Body emphasises that before submitting the brief, the NGO has to ask 
permission from the Panel. The Panel has the discreation to decide whether to enable it and on 
which conditions.165 
Furthermore, Art 13 (2) adds: “panels may seek information from any relevant source and may 
consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter. With respect to a factual 
issue concerning a scientific or other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may 
request an advisory report in writing from an expert review group.” Hence, the information 
must be relevant to the case. Not every piece of information that an NGO wishes to submit may 
be considered admissible. The decision of the relevancy depends on the Panel’s discretion.  
The Panel of the Shrimp case interpreted Art 13 only from an active solicitation perspective 
and stated nothing on the admission of unsolicited briefs.166 On the contrary, the Appellate 
Body found that the Panel´s interpretation of the word “seek” is unnecessarily formal and 
technical.167  Furthermore, it found that the Panel has a capacity to decide whether to accept 
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such unsolicited briefs168 or itself invite such briefs to be submitted169. Therefore, it is clear that 
the Panel was stricter and interpreted the provision in a strictly according to its wording. That, 
however, is true. The provision does not explicitly state that an amicus curiae can give the 
information to the WTO DSB of its own initiative. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body, in its 
interpretation, granted such a right by interpreting the provision in a teleological manner and 
considered most probably the aims that these briefs could help the DSB to achieve.  
In addition, India seemed surprised by the interpretation of the Appellate Body since the word 
“seek” already suggests that an amicus curiae cannot submit its observations of its own 
initiative. In conclusion, India found that the Appellate Body interpreted the provision loosely 
and wrongly.170 Some other countries agreed (i.e. Thailand171, Pakistan172, Brazil173, Mexico174, 
Hong Kong175 and Japan176). On the other hand, others did not brought up this issue in the 
debate (i.e. the United States177, European Communities178, Australia179, the Philippines180 and 
Switzerland181). Since some of the countries did not bring up the issue, it can be concluded that 
they did not mind such an interpretation and are therefore in favour of unsolicited amicus curiae 
participation. Furthermore, it is an interesting tendency that economically strong countries 
favour amicus curiae participation of its own initiative, while countries with larger populations 
like transparency and the strictness of the rules. Most probably, the reason lies in the resources 
available. Economically stronger countries are more willing to risk having amicus curiae in the 
proceedings since they have more resources to deal with the outcome. While for the large 
population countries, these outcomes would be heavier to bear. 
Art 12 of the DSU gives an overview of the Panel procedures and more precisely its Art 12 (1) 
provides for the obligation to follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 unless the Panel 
decides otherwise after consulting the parties to the dispute. Moreover, the DSU appendix 4 
foresees special rules in the WTO dispute settlement system that are applicable to experts: 
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mostly they consist of the regulation on how and when the information must be submitted. 
Thus, while satisfying the named provisions and interpreting the right to seek in a loose manner, 
amicus participation for NGOs could be acceptable. Despite that, it is important to notice that 
Art 13 of the DSU applies only to the Panel proceedings, and therefore the Appellate Body gave 
its opinion regarding amicus curiae regulation in Panel Proceedings. 
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body’s such approach was heavily criticised and this seemed to 
cause the Appellate Body to seek a lower profile for some time.182 The main criticism was that 
the WTO is an inter-governmental organisation. NGOs do not represent governments and 
therefore they should not be granted the status of amicus curiae in the WTO. Furthermore, the 
admissibility of amicus briefs is a substantive rather than a procedural issue, which should be 
decided by the WTO Members, not the Panel or the Appellate Body.183 On the one hand, it is a 
valuable argument. The disputes in the WTO are State-centric and non-State actors cannot 
possibly have an interest in the matters. Therefore, there is no logical need to include them. On 
the other hand, while aiming for justice, NGO participation would be a way in. This criticism 
understands amicus curiae status narrowly. NGOs usually are specialised in some field and 
therefore care about it and by their participation, they can contribute to more just and equitable 
rulings. Moreover, NGOs can have a valuable insight to the matter that Panels and even States 
might not have. Therefore, the system should consider what the aims and goals in the dispute 
settlement are. However, the entirely different question is if States desire it or not. The 
participation of amicus curiae might make the outcome of the dispute unforeseeable, which 
States do not like. States do not want to lose power over the process and therefore are usually 
against NGO participation. 
Despite this in 2000 in the Australia-Salmon case the Panel confirmed the Appellate Body’s 
view from the US-Shrimp case and accepted the amicus briefs pursuant to the authority granted 
to the Panel under Art 13 (1) of the DSU.184 Thus, this case shared the opinion of the Panel 
from the US-Shrimp case in desiring NGOs contribution.  
In the European Communities-Asbestos case, the Panel received five written submissions from 
NGOs. Some of them the Panel took into account by referring also to the Appellate Body 
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decision in the US-Shrimp case. The Panel in this case also saw Art 13 of the DSU as a 
possibility to accept amicus curiae briefs from NGOs. One of the briefs was rejected due to it 
being submitted at the wrong stage of the proceedings when it could not be accepted.185 Hence, 
in some cases the Panels have affirmed the Appellate Body’s findings from the US-Shrimp 
case.  
Furthermore, amicus curiae briefs have also been submitted by NGOs in other cases, and not 
in every case has the Panel elaborated on the issue of participation possibilities. For example in 
2001 in the case European Communities-Anti-Dumping duties the Panel simply stated that it 
did not find it necessary to consider the amicus curiae brief submitted by an NGO.186 No further 
elaboration on the reasons was given. However, as discussed above, part of the Panels discretion 
concerning NGO participation, is to decide if and on what terms a Panel may benefit from 
NGOs. The cited articles do not oblige the Panel to justify the rejection of amicus briefs by 
NGOs. It is a matter of the Panel’s willingness and politeness to provide reasoning on the 
matter. 
In the Canadian Softwood Lumber case, a Canadian NGO Interior Alliance was allowed to 
submit its amicus curiae observations to the Panel.187 The role of the outcome of the NGO brief 
is not certain.188 Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that in this case this was not an INGO 
but a regional NGO that was permitted to submit its observations in front of the DSB. However, 
in most cases in the area of international law, NGO amici are INGOs, and then there are rare 
cases like the one cited currently, which also allow regional NGOs to be amici. 
To sum up, it can be seen that an NGO acting as an amicus may be a possibility in the context 
of the WTO. However, this possibility is highly debated. This possibility is quite difficult and 
not favoured by everyone. 
2.2.2. The Appellate Body Proceedings  
Similarly, to the Panel Proceedings, there is no explicit provision allowing for amicus curiae in 
the Appellate Body Proceedings neither in the DSU nor in the Working Procedures. On the 
other hand, there is no prohibition either.  
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This issue was discussed in the US-Carbon Steel case.189 In this case, unsolicited amicus briefs 
were submitted by NGOs to the Appellate Body. The case cites as a basis for such participation 
Art 17 (9) of the DSU, which establishes that “working procedures shall be drawn up by the 
Appellate Body in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Director-General, and 
communicated to the Members for their information”. In the US-Carbon Steel case, the 
Appellate Body explains that this provision states clearly the broad authority of the Appellate 
Body in adopting procedural rules. These rules may not conflict with any rules and procedures 
in the DSU. However, the only restriction is the consultation obligation. In that sense, this links 
to the fact that by consulting with the Members (meaning the parties and third parties to the 
case), it is ensured that parties and decision-making authorities agree or at least have knowledge 
of such an intention. Neither the cited article nor the US-Carbon Steel case forbids NGO 
participation when the consultation results are negative (mostly when the consultants do not 
agree with NGO participation). Hence, on the discretion of the Appellate Body it is nevertheless 
possible to include NGOs in the matter. Thus, the Appellate Body is of the opinion that as long 
as they act in accordance with the provisions of the DSU and the covered agreements, they have 
the legal authority to decide whether to accept and consider any information that they believe 
is pertinent and useful in an appeal.190 
Furthermore, the Working Procedures gives a similar competence to the Appellate Body. 
According to Rule 16 (1), it is permitted to develop an appropriate procedure in certain specified 
circumstances where a procedural question arises that is not covered by the Working Procedures 
on the condition that it is not in contravention with the established Working Procedures and the 
DSU.191 
In front of the Appellate Body in the European Communities-Asbestos case the participation of 
persons other than the parties and third parties to the dispute was also discussed. In this case, 
the Appellate Body decided to adopt the Additional Procedure pursuant to Rule 16 (1) of the 
Working Procedures for the purposes of this appeal only.192 In the Additional Procedure point 
1 the reasoning for the need to adopt this procedure is cited as being in the interests of fairness 
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and orderly procedure.193 The Appellate Body in this case gave a large scope for determining 
the persons who may submit briefs by stating that: “any person, whether natural or legal, other 
than a party or a third party to this dispute, wishing to file a written brief with the Appellate 
Body, must apply for leave to file such a brief from the Appellate Body by noon on Thursday, 
16 November 2000.”194 From this, it can be clearly seen that the Appellate Body accepts amicus 
briefs from everyone who has a wish to submit one. This interpretation does not narrowly permit 
only State actors to participate in WTO proceedings nor only NGOs. Even individuals as such 
could be subjected to submitting the briefs. Hence, the reasoning behind this is that it is most 
likely to guarantee just proceedings and therefore a just judgment and encourage anyone with 
the relevant information to come forward by contributing to the knowledge and outcome of the 
Appellate proceedings. 
Nevertheless, many States (e.g. Mexico) criticised this WTO decision by highlighting that in 
the Uruguay Round the participation of amici was already discussed and rejected by States.195 
Furtherrmore, States found that in the named Asbestos case “by imposing such conditions, the 
Appellate Body had taken a decision that Members themselves had not adopted, thereby clearly 
contravening Art IX of the WTO Agreement and diminishing the rights and obligations of 
Members, in contravention of Art 19.2 of the DSU”.196 States were concerned that in the case 
of a non-state actor’s participation, WTO Members would become observers rather than the 
main actors in establishing fundamental dispute settlement rules in the WTO.197 
On the other hand, not all the Appellate Body proceedings have allowed amici that are non-
members in the context of the WTO. In the Carbon Steel case, the Appellate Body emphasised 
that in the WTO dispute settlement system, the DSU envisages participation only by parties and 
third parties to a dispute as a matter of legal rights. Furthermore, the Appellate Body cites Art 
1 (1) of the DSU, according to which only Members have a legal right to participate as parties 
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or third parties in a particular dispute.198 The Appellate Body explains that non-WTO members, 
individuals and organisations have no legal right to make submissions to or to be heard by the 
Appellate Body. Thus, the Appellate Body has no legal duty to accept or consider unsolicited 
amicus curiae briefs submitted by such individuals or organisations.199 However, this decision 
did not deny the possibility of an NGO acting as amici. The Appellate Body states that it has 
the legal authority under the DSU to accept and consider amicus curiae briefs in an appeal in 
which they find it pertinent and useful to do so. Although, in the current appeal, they did not 
find it necessary to take the two amicus curiae briefs filed into account in rendering their 
decision.200 Thus, they recognise their own right to decide whether to accept an NGO as amici 
or not. However, it is a right, not an obligation which came out in the case reasoning.  
Furthermore, briefs have also been rejected due to the matter not being relevant to the tasks.201 
However, in this case the brief was addressing some legal issues arisen from the appeal.202 It is 
clear that in the case that the NGO cannot contribute to the proceedings, there is no point 
including it. Therefore, from this the principle that NGOs should only be allowed to participate 
in the proceedings when they have relevant information can be derived. The relevance is the 
discretion of the Appellate Body to assess. Moreover, the prerequisite for NGOs having relevant 
information in the Appellate proceedings is not stated as being within the Appellate Body’s 
discretion. In the Panel Proceedings regulation, it is explicitly stated that information must be 
relevant to the matter. 
To sum up, there is a normative possibility to include NGOs as amicus in WTO dispute 
settlements. This possibility is also used in practice. However, it is not a common point of view. 
  
                                                          
198 WTO WT/DS138/AB/R, 7. June 2000, United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-
Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate 
Body, para 40. 
199 WTO WT/DS138/AB/R, 7. June 2000, United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-
Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate 
Body, para 41. 
200 WTO WT/DS138/AB/R, 7. June 2000, United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-
Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate 
Body, para 42. 
201 WTO WT/DS122/AB/R, 12. March 2001, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of 
Iron or Non-alloy Steel and H-beams from Poland, Report of the Appellate Body, para 78. 
202 WTO WT/DS122/AB/R, 12. March 2001, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of 
Iron or Non-alloy Steel and H-beams from Poland, Report of the Appellate Body, para 62. 
42 
 
3. Court Proceedings Protecting the Public Interest 
3.1. International Criminal Court  
The Statute of the International Criminal Court (also known as the Rome Statute) does not 
include a provision on the participation of amicus curiae in Court proceedings.203 However, Art 
44(4) of the concerned Statute stipulates, “the Court may, in exceptional circumstances, employ 
the expertise of gratis personnel offered by States Parties, intergovernmental organizations or 
nongovernmental organizations to assist with the work of any of the organs of the Court.” 
On the contrary, the ICC rules of procedure provide a basis for amicus curiae participation in 
Art 103 (1). This provision establishes that it may be useful for the proper determination of the 
case, invite or grant leave to a State, organization or person to submit any written or oral 
observation on any issue that the Chamber deems appropriate.204 Thus pursuant to this 
provision, the ICC can freely accept written and oral submissions from NGOs if it is considered 
desirable in order to achieve the proper administration of justice. However, Art 103 of the Rules 
of Procedure is a broad discretionary power in order to invite or, in the case of spontaneous 
submissions, to grant leave to submit observations.205 
In the pre-trial of the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Court received a 
request to submit amicus curiae comments written and orally by the NGO Women’s Initiatives 
for Gender Justice.206 The INGO wished to make a submission on the Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 
powers and duties interpretation of in Art 61 Rome Statute’s established confirmation 
hearing.207 The Defence strongly opposed this submission being accepted208 as did the 
Prosecutor209. The Prosecutor noted that this request went beyond the case since the amicus 
curiae wished the Prosecutor to change the charges. Furthermore, the amicus aimed to promote 
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its interest, rather than demonstrate any links to the matter.210 The Court decided to deny 
granting leave and invited the NGO to refile the submission in a more general case at issue.211 
This is a notable situation. The invitation to refile the submission shows the Court’s great 
willingness to have valuable outside input, also from NGOs. Moreover, the author of the current 
thesis has not come across other cases like this from the other courts, tribunals and organisations 
analysed. 
The NGO submitted a new request212, to which the Prosecutor opposed for the same reasons as 
the NGO wished to add charges to the case.213 However, the final decision on an amicus curiae 
submission is not available to the public; it has to be considered as being denied. 214 Therefore, 
it would be logical to conclude that it is not in the power of the amicus curiae to either change 
the charges or say anything about the severeity of the charges. The amicus, therefore, could 
most probably give its expertise on the facts.  
In the same case, the International Criminal Bar215 and the Ordre des Avocats de Paris216 wanted 
to submit their briefs as amicus curiae. The Registrar found that such participation must be in 
accordance with the “proper administration of justice”, which was not the case in these 
submissions.217 The Registrar also elaborated on the further requirements of the amicus curiae 
and stated that it has to be impartial and act in the interest of justice.218 This also justifies why 
the previous submissions by Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice were denied. The 
intervention regarding the charges cannot be considered as being in the name of the proper 
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administration of justice. Furthermore, such submissions will most probably raise the question 
of being partial. That is, however, not acceptable in the case of an amicus curiae participation. 
Moreover, the Registrar gave guidelines for the successful admission of an amicus curiae 
intervention: firstly, the intervention has to be desirable for the proper administration of justice; 
secondly, the amicus curiae brief must deal with legal arguments and general legal points and 
not with factual arguments, and thirdly, it must enlighten the Court with a new legal issue 
relying on its proven expertise.219 Thus, it is certain that amicus curiae participation cannot be 
random nor imprudent. The amicus curiae serves a certain value and certain aims. In the 
approving of amicus curiae submissions the Court, while exercising its discretion, must reckon 
with these guidelines highlighted in the Registrar’s decision in order for the amicus 
participation to be in the proper administration of justice. 
Furthermore, in the case of the Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and 
Dominic Ongwen several amici curiae requests were submitted: the Uganda Victim’s 
Foundation and the Redress Trust jointly submitted their request220 and Amnesty International 
submitted a second request221.  
The first request was allowed, however, the Court gave strict rules in doing so: the specific 
timeframe and issues on which the amicus curiae can elaborate.222 Such a restriction fulfils the 
aim of getting the most needed information to the Court and restricting the misuse of the amicus 
curiae position. Within such restricted boundaries for giving an opinion, that which happened 
in the previously mentioned the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo case with the Women’s 
Initiatives for Gender Justice cannot happen. A second request by Amnesty International was 
denied due to the Court not being sure if it needed assistance on the legal matters the INGO 
proposed.223 
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In 2009 in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Amnesty International 
seeked leave to submit an amicus curiae submission 224 as did Women’s Initiative for Gender 
Justice225. Both INGOs were granted leave to submit their briefs and specific guidelines were 
provided. For Amnesty International, the issues were specified.226 
Hence, from these examples it can be seen that the ICC is strict when providing permission to 
submit amicus curiae briefs. In addition, as can be seen from these examples, the Court has the 
competence to limit the issues that the amicus curiae can submit to the Court. 
 
3.2. International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia  
 
The Statute of the ICTY does not establish the possibility of amicus participation.227 However, 
Art 74 of the Rules of Procedure states “a Chamber may if it considers it desirable for the proper 
determination of the case, invite or grant leave to a State, organization or person to appear 
before it and make submissions on any issue specified by the Chamber”.228 Furthermore, in 
order to assist the submissions of an amicus curiae, the Court amended the document 
“Information concerning the submission of amicus curiae briefs” in February 2015. According 
to this document, an application can be submitted for leave to file an amicus curiae brief or to 
appear as amicus curiae unsolicited or in response to an invitation from the Chamber. This 
Chamber’s invitation can be specific (i.e., directed at an individual State, organisation or 
person(s)) or general.229 Notwithstanding the basis for the submission, the amicus curiae 
submissions shall be limited to questions of law and cannot include factual evidence relating to 
elements of a crime charged.230 The Chamber at its sole discretion may invite amicus curiae to 
participate in the oral argument.231 
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In the Milošević case, Milošević did not recognize the ICTY and refused to defend himself in 
person or to appoint defence counsel.232 In response, the Chamber adopted an innovative 
solution by deciding to appoint amicus curiae to assist the Chamber in ensuring a fair trial.233 
It has been found that this solution is not persuasive for several reasons, inter alia that the judges 
are the guardians of justice and it is not clear how they need assistance for ensuring a fair trial 
and furthermore in criminal matters there is a debate between two parties before an impartial 
arbiter. Nevertheless, the essence of the trial requires that the charges must be examined by way 
of confrontation between these parties.234 The role of amicus curiae in the current case is blurry 
and uncertain. Usually, the amicus has to be impartial; however, in the current case, it seems 
that the Tribunal wants amici to represent the accused. That, in the opinion of the author of the 
current thesis, goes beyond the main aims of amicus. Zappalà, in his opinion, also found that 
an amicus does not fulfil the named criteria and therefore can hardly considered a Party.235 
The first amicus curiae briefs before the ICTY were submitted in the Tadić Case.236 These 
briefs were filed by Christine Chinkin and a joint amicus curiae brief was submitted by Rhonda 
Copeland, Jennifer M. Green, Felice Gaer and Sara Hossain on behalf of the Jacob Blaustein 
Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights of the American Jewish Committee, the Center 
for Constitutional Rights, the International Women’s Human Rights Law Clinic of the City 
University of New York, the Women Refugees Project of the Harvard Immigration and Refugee 
Program and Cambridge and Somerville Legal Services.237 Later in the same case, the NGO, 
Juristes sans Frontières, wanted to submit a brief and was granted such leave to file a written 
brief as amicus curiae in the appeal.238 However, although the briefs were allowed, there is no 
reference to the content of the amicus briefs in the judgments of the case, nor can the influence 
of the briefs on the judgments be seen. Therefore, it cannot be analysed whether the Tribunal 
took submissons into consideration while deciding the case. 
Furthermore, in the Furundzija case, on 9 November 1998 the Trial Chamber received an 
application to file an amicus curiae brief from eleven applicants who were scholars of the 
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international human rights of women or representatives of NGOs.239 The applicants requested 
the Tribunal to reconsider its decision having regard to the rights of witness "A" to equality, 
privacy, personal security and to representation by counsel.240 Furthermore, in the granting 
order, the Trial Chamber found that the Trial Chamber for the purposes of the judgment would 
duly consider any relevant parts of briefs.241 This suggests that briefs are to some extent to be 
considered when deciding the case. However, once again there is no solid proof of that. 
In the case of Blaškić, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald invited the submission of amicus curiae 
briefs on the issues raised in the case.242 Leave to submit briefs was granted to many individual 
experts on international law (e.g. Bruno Simma) and organisations, including some NGOs such 
as the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Juristes sans 
Frontiéres, the Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights and the Coalition for International 
Justice.243 The Court invited all that were granted leave to attend the hearing on 11th April 2011 
in order to respond to the questions of Judges and give further assistance if needed.244 
Nevertheless, the amicus curiae briefs were not mentioned in the judgment of the Trial 
Chamber.245  
Furthermore, the Erdemović case has been seen as a sample case for persons and organisations 
who/which sought to appear as amicus curiae in proceedings.246 Nevertheless, there is not a 
Tribunal Order granting leave, nor mentioning amicus participation in the judgments.247 Hence, 
Anna-Karin Lindblom concluded that it may be assumed that leave was refused.248  
To sum up, it is clear that the Tribunal is willing to accept amicus curiae in the proceedings and 
it is not highly selective on the question of who can be amici, meaning they allow individuals 
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and NGOs. However, it is not certain to what extent and if the Tribunal takes into consideration 
the submissions filed by amici. Maybe it does. 
3.3. Special Court for Sierra Leone  
 
Unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, the SCSL was established by an agreement between the UN 
and Sierra Leone. The Special Court was established with the aim of the prosecution of persons 
who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30th November 1996. 249 
Similar to the Statutes of the ICTR and the ICTY, the Statute of the SCSL does not foresee 
amicus curiae participation250. Nevertheless, SCSL Rule 74 states that the Chamber have a right 
to invite or grant leave to any State, organization or person to make submissions on any issue 
specified by the Chamber.251 Hence, there is no limitation against NGOs submitting briefs. 
In the case of Morris Kallon, the SCSL allowed NGOs (i.e. the Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights and the International Commission of Jurists) to submit written briefs and present oral 
submissions.252 In the decision, the Court explained that these NGOs are distinguished 
international organisations, which have experience in dealing with issues relating to torture, 
international law and war crimes. The Court found that these organisations did not seek leave 
to intervene due to an ulterior motive (e.g. to gain publicity for themselves or to use the Court’s 
privileges and immunities to put declarations on the record or to promote some hidden agenda). 
On the contrary, they offered competent guidance on the complex issues.253 Therefore, in order 
to be successful in gaining permission to submit written and/or oral submissions, an NGO 
cannot be a random. It has to be an expert in the field with a wish to contribute to justice. 
However, as highlighted by the Court, the organisations wanting to intervene might, in some 
cases, have agendas of their own. That is a threat to the amicus curiae’s purpose to contribute 
to justice and hence has to be avoided.  
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Furthermore, in the named case, the Court gave general guidance on the interpretation of Rule 
74. It emphasised that an amicus curiae is usually invited because of its experience on the legal 
subject in question, amicus curiae will be expected to present all relevant materials and if 
appropriate to express a view on the law. However, the counsel for the parties should have no 
inhibitions in examining or challenging that view.254 Moreover, it emphasises that intervening 
parties may have a direct or an indirect interest: direct in the sense that the decision will be 
likely to create a precedent affecting them in the future and indirect in the sense that an amicus 
may wish to have the law clarified, declared or developed in a particular way.255 The Special 
Court does not grant leave for amicus submissions according to its subjects. Every third person 
that is in possession of material and wishes to submit a brief should properly convey this to the 
Prosecution or the Defence.256 
While deciding on the admissibility of amicus curiae brief, the Trial Chamber considered the 
jurisprudence of other criminal tribunals, and in conclusion listed three grounds for 
admissibility. Firstly, the applicant wanting to become amicus curiae has to have a strong 
interest in or a strong view on the subject matter before the Court. Secondly, it is desirable to 
enlighten the Tribunal on the occurred events. Finally, it might be effective “to gather additional 
legal views with respect to the legal principles involved, not with respect to the particular 
circumstances” of the concerned case.257 Hence, the submissions of the potential amici have to 
efficient in order to render a just decision on the matter. Notwithstanding the revision of other 
criminal tribunals, contrary to the precedent set by the ICTR, amicus briefs will be admissible 
in the context of the SCSL regardless of whether all of the submissions relate to “live issues”.258 
Judge Robertson stated, in order to highlight some problematic aspects, that “it may be, as the 
Prosecution protest, that these submissions will go wider than the issues before the Court, but 
if so, such inappropriate breadth will be ignored and will not be examined in the course of the 
short oral hearing they will be allocated. In any event, the Prosecution will have every 
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opportunity to refute or confound their arguments as of course will the defence”.259 Thus, he 
recognised the possibility that the NGOs’ submissions might not always be appropriate. Mainly 
these submissions may address the issues that are not with the relevant importance to the 
proceedings. However, in these cases the Chambers are allowed to reject the case, since the 
judges are the guardians of justice. Thus, the issues, which the amici can elaborate on, must be 
verified by the court. In the end, the court decides on what matters it needs additional 
information.  
Not in every case has the submission been allowed by the SCSL. In the Fulana and Kondewa 
case (CDF case), the Court denied Human Rights Watch leave to appear as amicus curiae.260 
The Court explained that the information that the NGO would have been able to give was 
unnecessary for the Court since it was already available before the brief. Furthermore, it stated 
that the Court is composed of Judges with sufficient professional standing and experience to 
deal with the issues.261 Thus, it can be seen, that in this case the Court used its right to decide 
which matters are useful and need further assistance. 
In conclusion, the SCSL is welcoming in granting leave to submit briefs and participate in oral 
proceedings as amicus curiae. However, this decision is highly dependent on the discretion of 
the judges sitting in the case; there are at least three criteria, which are mentioned above, to be 
considered while accepting NGOs or other persons to submit briefs. Mainly, the aim of the 
amicus in the SCSL is to render the proceedings more just.    
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4. Human Rights Court Proceedings Protecting Individual Interests at 
the Regional Level 
4.1. European Court of Human Rights  
The ECHR does not refer explicitly to amicus curiae participation but to third party 
participation. Art 36(2) ECHR establishes that “the President of the Chamber may, in the 
interests of the proper administration of justice, invite or grant leave to any contracting State 
which is not a party to the proceedings, or any person concerned who is not the applicant, to 
submit written comments or, in exceptional circumstances, to take part in an oral hearing”.262 
Thus, according to this article, an NGO could fall under “any concerned person” since the 
article does not distinguish between persons. However, such a kind of amicus curiae 
participation has to serve the interests of the proper administration of justice.  The aim is that 
the Court can have all available information before rendering a judgment in the case.263 
The detailed guidelines of such an intervention are established in Art 44 of the Rules of Court.264 
Furthermore, ECHR Rule 61(3) states: “requests for leave for this purpose must be duly 
reasoned and submitted in one of the official languages, within a reasonable time after the fixing 
of the written procedure.” Thus, it is evident that the NGO, who wants to be granted a leave to 
submit amicus curiae submissions, has to give its reasons for that. The reasoning, however, has 
to fulfil the criteria named in the provision. 
In human rights related cases amicus curiae intervention by NGOs has been seen to seek five 
main objectives: to reinforce the position of individual applicants by giving external and 
objective support to the arguments invoked; to put forward common interests not represented; 
to contribute to the development of international law; to promote fundraising; and to raise the 
attention of the public opinion.265 Hence, the considerations behind what form of amicus curiae 
participation is allowed before the ECtHR are ambiguous and suggest that amicus curiae 
participation must have a value and effect to the proceedings. Moreover, amicus curiae 
interventions have achieved important goals in the ECtHR proceedings. For instance, in the 
case of Soering v. United Kingdom Amnesty International, acting as amicus curiae, convinced 
the Court that the “death row phenomenon” constituted inhuman treatment in violation of the 
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European Convention.266 Nevertheless, before 1998 private applicants were not considered full 
parties to the ECtHR, hence there were limited possibilities for amicus submissions.267 
The first ever known request to submit information to the Court as amicus curiae was in the 
Tyrer case268, in which the request was denied without explanation. The request to submit 
written and oral submissions was filed by the National Council for Civil Liberties.269  
Furthermore, in the case of Winterwerp, the British Government asked if the information could 
be submitted according to Rule 38 (1) and got the response that “[t]he Chamber may, at the 
request of a Party or of Delegates of the Commission or proprio motu, decide to hear /…/ in 
any other capacity any person whose evidence or statements seem likely to assist it in the 
carrying out of its task”.270 Thus, the Court established that it has the capacity to decide, of its 
own initiative or by request, on the participation of amicus curiae. Furthermore, the current 
position of the Court does not limit the circle of persons. Therefore, according to it, NGOs could 
also be amicus curiae before the Court. 
For the first time, in 1981, the ECtHR accepted the NGO Trades Union Congress (TUC)’s 
amicus curiae brief in the Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom case and used the 
same procedure as in the case of Winterwerp.271 The TUC representative was also allowed to 
participate in the oral proceedings.272  
One of the landmark cases in the ECtHR for NGO amicus curiae participation is the Malone vs 
United Kingdom case. In the named case, the Post Office Engineering Union (also known as 
POEU) requested leave to submit written comments, indicating among other things its “specific 
occupational interest” in the case and five themes it would like to elaborate on in its written 
comments. The President of the ECtHR granted the leave. However, he did so on narrower 
terms than those the POEU requested. He established that “the comments should bear solely on 
certain [issues] of the matters referred to in the POEU’s list of proposed themes and then only 
"in so far as such matters relate to the particular issues of [the] alleged violation of the 
Convention which are before the Court [up] for decision in the Malone case".”273 Nevertheless, 
there is no further mention of the brief in the decision-making part of the judgment.274 However, 
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from the named case, it is clear that submissions by NGOs have to be relevant to the case, 
meaning in the wider sense on the issues that are discussed in the court. Nevertheless, it may 
seem logical on a theoretical level but it may not always be the case in reality. If NGOs have 
their own agenda, it will not contribute to justice, which is the one of the main ideas of amicus 
participation.  Thus, such a restriction is, in the opinion of this thesis’ author, relevant. Similar 
to the Malone case, the Court allowed the National Association for Mental Health to participate 
as amicus curiae in the Ashingdane case. Furthermore, the Court established that amicus 
submissions should be strictly linked to certain case-connected matters.275  
Amicus curiae briefs by NGOs have been allowed in many other cases.276 The most frequent 
amici, according to empirical studies, are the NGOs: Interights, the International Commission 
of Jurists, the AIRE Centre, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Liberty, Amnesty 
International, the Open Society Justice Initiative and Human Rights Watch.277 So from the 
empirical study conducted by Van Den Eynde, it is evident that the larger and powerful INGOs 
dealing with Human Rights are usually the ones that are interested in participating as amici 
curiae.  
Regarding Estonian cases before the ECHR, several NGOs filed an amicus curiae submission 
in the Delfi case and their submissions are precisely mentioned in the judgment.278 The Helsinki 
Foundation for Human Rights highlighted the differences between the internet and traditional 
media. It explained that ”online services like Delfi acted simultaneously in two roles: as content 
providers with regard to their own news and as host providers with regard to third-party 
comments.“279 Furthemore, the amicus was of the opinion that authors of written comments 
should be liable.280  
The INGO gave the opinion that the internet was an innovation that allowed any person to 
express his or her views to the world without needing permission from publishers. The aim of 
comment platforms is to enable and promote public debate. Furthermore, the NGO argued that 
making websites responsible for user made comments constitutes an unacceptable burden on 
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websites.281 Furthermore, if they took all precautionary measures to remove content, they 
should not be held liable.282  
According to the NGO Access, the fundamental rights of privacy and freedom of expression 
are supported by anonymity and pseudonymity. The regulatory prohibition of these is an 
interference with privacy and freedom of expression.283 
The NGO Media Legal Defence Initiative also submitted its memorial by finding that through 
the possibility of commenting, readers could debate the news amongst themselves and with 
journalists. That turned commenting into the participatory form of speech which recognised the 
readers’ voices.284 Furthermore, it established that a State has to ensure the necessary regulatory 
framework in order to protect and promote freedom of expression and also to guard other 
rights.285 This NGO also highlighted the tendencies in North America and Europe, in order to 
compare the situation with Delfi. Thus, monitoring before posting a comment was deemed 
unusual; post-publication moderation, however, a practical tendency.286 
Such a wide range of references in the judgment suggests that the court took the amici 
submissions into consideration while rendering their judgement on the matter. 
Overall, the ECtHR is generous in providing amicus curiae access to the proceedings to NGOs. 
However, the Court may limit the questions that the amicus curiae can raise. Nevertheless, the 
impact of the amicus curiae can be seen in some of the cases before the ECtHR.  
4.2.  Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
4.2.1. Contentious cases 
The Inter-American Court has an extensive amicus curiae practice, which differs between 
contentious and advisory proceedings.287 Regarding contentious cases, the Statute of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights does not contain an explicit legal basis for amicus curiae 
participation288 and neither does the American Convention on Human Rights289. The old Rules 
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of Procedure also did not allow the participation of amicus curiae.290 The new Rules of 
Procedure established amicus curiae participation. The same Rules define the term “amicus 
curiae” as follows: “the person or institution who is unrelated to the case and to the proceeding 
and submits to the Court reasoned arguments on the facts contained in the presentation of the 
case or legal considerations on the subject-matter of the proceeding by means of a document or 
an argument presented at a hearing”.291 The basis for such participation has been seen in Art 
45(1) of the Rules, which establishes that “the Court may at any stage of the proceedings obtain 
on its own motion, any evidence it considers helpful. In particular, it may hear as a witness, 
expert witness or in any other capacity, any person whose evidence, statement or opinion it 
deems to be relevant”.292 The current article does not explicitly allow for unsolicited amicus 
curiae participation; however this has been seen as a basis for it.293  It should be noted that in 
this rule the Court has not limited the circle of potential amici. Therefore, from the wording it 
can be concluded that NGOs could be subject to giving relevant information to the Court. 
Art 44 of the Rules establishes the procedure for amicus curiae arguments. Its first subsection 
does not discriminate stating that amici can be any persons or institutions. Furthermore, the 
same provison states that the means are contained in Art 28(1) of these Rules of Procedure. 294  
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has, in its contentious proceedings, admitted amici 
curiae briefs by NGOs many times. For instance, in the Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras case, 
the NGOs Amnesty International, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights 
Committee submitted their briefs to the Court.295 In the Godínez Cruz v. Honduras case some 
NGOs submitted their briefs: Amnesty International, the Asociación Centroamericana de 
Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 
the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the Minnesota Lawyers International Human 
Rights Committee.296 Furthermore, in the Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales v. Honduras case, 
Amnesty International, the Asociación Centroamericana de Familiares de Detenidos 
Desaparecidos, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the Lawyers Committee 
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for Human Rights and the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee made 
their submissions to the Court.297 More recently in the case of Espinoza Gonzáles v Peru, 
several NGOs appeared as amici curiae: the “Marisela Escobedo” Gender and the Justice Clinic 
of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico and also Women’s Link Worldwide and the 
Legal Clinic of the Universidad de Valencia.298 However, in these named cases and in many 
other cases, there were no references to such submissions in the judgments themselves, beside 
the fact that they were submitted.  
Nevertheless, NGOs in general have more rights before the IAcHR than they do elsewhere. For 
example, NGOs can also be parties in front of the Court. Nevertheless, there is a restriction that 
an NGO must be legally recognised by at least one member state (American Convention on 
Human Rights Art 44).299 However, in practice it has not been an issue.300 It can be concluded 
from this fact that American countries emphasise NGO rights and their protection more. 
Otherwise there is no explanation as to why NGOs can stand as parties in front of the IAcHR. 
Thus, it might also be that this society values NGO contribution to international law to the 
extent that it allows NGOs to protect their own rights. Nevertheless, there is no proof of this.  
To sum up, it is clear that the IAcHR is eager to allow amicus curiae participation in its practice 
and has done so in many cases with NGOs. However, since there are neither citations nor 
references to the briefs in the judgments’ resolution parts or summaries of the amici 
observations in the briefs, the actual value of NGO participation is uncertain. Furthermore, 
many of the accepted NGOs are national NGOs rather than INGOs.   
4.2.2. Advisory cases 
Pursuant to Art 73(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Presidency of the Court has a discretionary 
power to invite or authorise any interested party to submit a written opinion on the requested 
issues covered. Furthermore, Art 74 of the Rules allows the court to apply the rules governing 
contentious proceedings to advisory proceedings to the extent that it deems them appropriate.301 
The Court has allowed many NGOs to submit their briefs as amici curiae. Moreover, among 
the existing international tribunals, the Inter-American Court has the most extensive amicus 
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curiae practice.302 However, the Court rarely quotes the briefs in the judgments303, therefore, it 
is uncertain whether and to what extent the judgments take into account the opinions of the 
amici304.  
Nevertheless, in the Advisory Opinion No 5 (Compulsory Membership in an Association 
Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism) some NGOs were allowed to submit their 
briefs. The NGOs that were allowed to participate as amici curiae in this case were: the Inter-
American Press Association, the Colegio de Periodistas of Costa Rica, the World Press 
Freedom Committee, the International Press Institute, the Newspaper Guild and the 
International Association of Broadcasting, the American Newspaper Publishers Association, 
the American Society of Newspaper Editors and the Associated Press, the Federación 
Latinoamericana de Periodistas, the International League for Human Rights and the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights with the Americas Watch Committee and the Committee to 
Protect Journalists.305 The Inter-American Press Association and the Colegio de Periodistas of 
Costa Rica were also heard at the oral pleadings.306  
Furthermore, the judgment also to some extent summarises their standpoints.307 The Colegio de 
Periodistas of Costa Rica pointed out that licensing guarantees journalists’ independence and 
further emphasised that licensing existed in the organic laws of professional “colegios”.308 
Furthermore, the Federación Latinoamericana de Periodistas discussed that licensing 
guarantees the right to the freedom of expression of their ideas to societies.309 The Court 
rendered a judgement where it found that “the compulsory licensing of journalists is 
incompatible with Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights if it denies any 
person access to the full use of the news media as a means of expressing opinions or imparting 
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information.”310 Therefore, it can be concluded that, the Court took into consideration the 
standpoints of the permitted amici to the same extent. 
In addition, in its Advisory Opinion 17, the Court also allowed three NGOs to participate as 
amici in the proceedings: Coordinadora Nicaragüense de ONG’s que trabajan con la Niñez y la 
Adolescencia (“CODENI”), Instituto Universitario de Derechos Humanos, A.C. of Mexico and 
Fundación Rafael Preciado Hernández, A.C.of Mexico.311 The Court made summaries of all 
the amici briefs and cited them in the judgment.312  
NGOs as amici were also allowed in advisory opinion 20313 and advisory opinion 21314. In 
advisory opinion 20, the brief summaries are stated in the judgement315, however, in advisory 
opinion 21, they are added in the annexes which are only available in Spanish316.  Thus, in the 
most recent advisory opinion judgments, the briefs are usually mentioned in the judgment itself, 
however, in the previous advisory opinions that was not the case. This shows, most probably, 
the tendency of amicus curiae briefs starting to be more valuable in the judgment-making 
process than they were before. It might also be the case that only the content and the structure 
of the advisory opinion judgment has been changed. Thus, the influence of NGOs is not that 
evident.   
To sum up, is certain that an NGO can appear as amicus curiae in front of the IAcHR. Usually 
the Court does not cite the brief in its judgments, however, in some cases this may be the case. 
The citing and the great number of briefs accepted most probably already shows their value to 
the proceedings and to the Court. Moreover, it can be seen from the examples (especially from 
their NGO names and titles) that some of the NGOs who were allowed to participate in the 
IAcHR proceedings were national NGOs.  
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CONCLUSION 
The aim of the current thesis was to investigate whether an NGO can participate as amicus 
curiae and if the answer is affirmative then, under which conditions and why NGOs are allowed 
to participate as amicus curiae in proceedings of international and regional courts and tribunals. 
Furthermore, in the cases where amici curiae have been allowed, this master’s thesis 
investigated whether NGO amicus briefs have helped courts in deciding the case and if the 
briefs were taken into account in the first place. Overall, it is interesting to see whether there 
are any universal criteria for amicus curiae participation.  
The current thesis originated from two hypothesises. Firstly, that there are no common rules in 
different institutions regarding NGO amicus curiae participation. Secondly, that amici has its 
impact on the judgment. 
The substantive part of the current thesis was divided into three groups of institutions: state-
centric dispute settlement proceedings, international criminal proceedings and regional human 
rights proceedings. 
Compared to the other institutions, the ICJ has been most conservative and prohibitive 
regarding NGO amicus curiae participation. The results in the contentious and advisory 
proceedings are to some extent different, however, still conservative considering  developments 
in the international law field.  
It has been suggested that there are two possible basic provisions for NGO amicus curiae 
participation in the contentious proceedings: Art 34 (2) and Art 50 ICJ Statute. However, Art 
50 seems more like the Court’s opportunity to engage an expert, rather than an NGO’s 
opportunity to intervene as amicus curiae of its own initiative. Notwithstanding, Art 50 is loose 
in its the circle of subjects and therefore, would most probably cause no problem for NGOs to 
give their expertise.  
On the contrary, Art 34(2) is highly debated and restrictive as to the circle of subjects who can 
use it. The provision uses the term “public international organisation”. However, from the 
grammatical interpretation, it is not clear who these organisations are. Furthermore, considering 
the historical interpretation of the provision, the drafting committee could not have meant 
NGOs at the time. However, in contemporary world it is debatable if the NGOs would be 
regarded as such organisations. The Court itself has never allowed an NGO to participate as an 
amicus in the course of contentious proceedings. The grounding case for such a refusal is the 
Asylum case, where the ICJ stated that an NGO is not a public international organisation. 
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Furthermore, the Rules of Procedure were amended and now they state that public international 
organisation denotes an organisation of states. 
In its advisory proceedings, the ICJ has been more liberal than in contentious proceedings, but 
still conservative compared to other institutions analysed. The ICJ has once, in the advisory 
opinion of the Status of South West Africa, allowed the NGO League on the Rights of Man to 
submit its brief. However, this opportunity was missed since the INGO violated the time limit 
that was given by the Court. That could not be considered as a good start. This resulted in the 
Court not accepting the delayed brief. After that, the Court never allowed an INGO to intervene. 
Nevertheless, the ICJ’s ancestor PCIJ itself invited an NGO to submit its observations in labour 
cases on at least two occasions.  
Due to the wide range of INGO requests to submit amicus curiae briefs, the Court adopted 
Practice Directions that state that briefs submitted by NGOs are not part of the case file. This 
Direction does not explicitly forbid an NGO from entering. It simply does not give power to 
the brief. However, parties can still become acquainted with it and use it in their memorials and 
observations. This is the reason why it might be considered a loophole for INGOs to participate 
in ICJ proceedings. 
The findings of this thesis suggest that in the case that provisions permitting amicus curiae are 
lacking, the WTO dispute settlement body may find a solution to include amici in the 
proceedings if they find it to be necessary. Nevertheless, there is no specific provision that 
explicitly allows or prohibits NGO participation as amicus curiae and the case law is highly 
dependable on the discretion of the dispute settlement body.  
In the Panel Proceedings, the basis for NGO participation in the proceedings is Art 12 and Art 
13 of the DSU. However, this is applicable only to the Panel Proceedings. The way in for NGO 
amici in the Appellate Body is by way of Art 17 (9) of the DSU and the Working Procedure 
Rule 16 (1). All the possibilities are used in practice.  
The most significant decision concerning NGOs was made in the US-Shrimp case in the 
framework of the WTO, which was the first to allow NGO participation as amicus curiae.  The 
case interpreted Art 13 of the DSU in a loose manner so that NGOs could be permitted to file 
amicus curiae briefs. The case is cited in many other later cases to establish the possibility to 
admit NGO briefs. However, there are still Panels that do not accept amici due to different 
reasons and of course; there is criticism on the international level as to why an NGO should not 
be considered as an amicus in the WTO: mainly because the WTO is a inter-state organisation. 
However, the dispute settlement in the WTO is meant for the Members of the WTO, there are 
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Panels and Appellate Body that have accepted their discretion to decide upon NGO 
participation as amicus curiae. The reasons may vary but the main goal is justice.  
Furthermore, the Appellate Body in the European-Communities – Asbestos case used its 
discretion widely by establishing the Additional Procedure for anyone who wishes to submit an 
amicus brief in the case: by anyone they did not exclude anybody, even individuals. 
Hence, the answer to the research question whether an NGO can be viewed as amicus curiae in 
the WTO dispute settlement system is affirmative. Nevertheless, it is highly debatable and a 
criticised option, but in proceedings a utilised option. 
The second chapter in the present thesis concerned international criminal proceedings and, more 
precisely, the proceedings of the ICC, the ICTY and the SCSL. All of the regulatory frameworks 
of the criminal tribunals are similar in permitting NGOs to participate in the proceedings. There 
are no issues with the normative grounds. These institutions analysed are also liberal in granting 
permission to submit briefs. In the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the ICC 
suggested refiling the submission which the INGO did. From the same case the rule is derived 
that amici curiae cannot intervene in the charges and severity of them but has to give its expert 
opinion on certain aspects. Usually in criminal proceedings, the Court or Tribunals established 
explicitly the issues on which NGOs can elaborate. Thus, criminal proceedings are liberal on 
granting permission and strict on the subject matter. 
In criminal proceedings, the issue lies in the question of the value of the briefs. From this thesis, 
it is evident that the briefs are not usually mentioned in the decision part of the judgments. 
Therefore, to know the actual value in the cases is hard if not impossible. While criminal 
institutions are liberal in granting permission to NGOs to submit their briefs, they are quite 
strict on the guidelines and the topic that NGOs can give their views on. In addition, it is 
interesting to note that international criminal bodies have allowed even individuals to 
participate. 
The third part of this thesis concerned regional human right courts: the IAcHR and the ECtHR. 
Both institutions are highly liberal and have ample NGO amicus curiae participation.  
The ECtHR has established in Art 36(2) ECHR the grounds for amicus curiae intervention. 
However, the provision itself establishes third party intervention and not explicitly amicus 
curiae participation. Noteworthy is the fact that this provision states that any person who is not 
the applicant can submit a brief. Therefore, the ECtHR is very loose in terms of the subject 
circle. Likewise as with international criminal proceedings, the ECHR has limited its leave to 
grant permission to submit briefs. Depending on the case, the ECtHR sometimes has summaries 
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in its judgments of the submissions of the amici. The influence is there, however, is highly 
dependent on the case and the Court. For example, in the case of Soering v. United Kingdom, 
Amnesty International as amicus curiae convinced the Court that “death row phenomenon” 
constituted inhuman treatment in violation of the European Convention.  
The ECtHR allowed several NGOs as amicus curiae in front of the Grand Chamber in the case 
of great importance to Estonia, the Delfi vs Estonia. All these briefs are precisely mentioned in 
the judement: the briefs from the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, the INGO Article 19, 
the NGO Access and the NGO Media Legal Defence Initiative.  
The IAcHR has accepted great variety of amicus curiae submissions in its contentious and 
advisory proceedings. The Rules of Procedure for the IAcHR establish the possibility of 
engaging an NGO as amicus curiae. There are no restrictions regarding permission and the 
Court has used this possibility in many cases in both types of proceedings. However, the 
interesting observation is that in advisory proceedings in some cases the Court has summarised 
the briefs but that is never the case in contentious proceedings. Therefore, it is hard to say if 
there is an influence by the amicus on the proceedings or if the judgment structure is just 
different.  
From the thesis analysis, it can be seen that third party intervention may be based on the 
constitutive treaty (e.g. the ECHR) or internal rules (e.g. the ICTY, ICC and SCSL). 
Furthermore, in the analysis an interesting point arose. While every institution analysed allowed 
INGOs, despite this the IAcHR also allowed domestic NGOs. It was a rare case but is still 
noteworthy. Moreover, usually the NGOs that are interested to participate in the proceedings 
as amicus curiae are commonly known big INGOs, e.g. Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch. Nevertheless, less known or very specific NGOs also have tried and succeeded in having 
amicus curiae status in many cases in front of different institutions. 
Coming back to the hypothesis of the current thesis, it can be concluded that it partly found 
affirmation. There are common tendencies in permitting the submission of briefs and in 
accepting them. Of the institutions that allow amicus participation, the fact that they all use their 
competency to restrict the circle of issues upon which NGOs can elaborate on, is similar. 
Furthermore, the institutions have published overall guidelines for submissions. Nevertheless, 
there are also many tendencies and rules that vary based on the institutions and the Court’s 
discretional power. The ICJ has been most conservative and has almost never (with a few 
exceptions) allowed an NGO to participate as amicus curiae. Concerning the value of the 
hypothesis, it emerged that it is impossible to view the value from the judgments directly. 
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However, academic writings suggest that the value is there. That is also confirmed by the wide 
range of acceptance of NGOs in some institutions.  
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VALITSUSVÄLISED ORGANISATSIOONID AMICUS CURIAENA 
RAHVUSVAHELISTES VAIDLUSE LAHENDAMISE 
INSTITUTSIOONIDES 
RESÜMEE 
Nii maailm kui ka rahvusvaheline õigus on pidevas muutumises. Alates Vestfaali rahust kehtis 
rahvusvahelisel tasandil riigikeskne teooria, mille alusel vaid riigid saavad olla õiguse 
subjektideks. Tollest ajast kuni tänapäevani on olukord muutunud. Nimelt on rahvusvahelisel 
tasandil laienenud osalejate ring. Tänapäeval on oma osa rahvusvahelisel areenil ka 
indiviididel, valitsusvälistel organisatsioonidel, äridel ja riikidevahelistel organisatsioonidel. 
Näiteks mõned ärid teevad koostööd valitsustega, samas kui valitsusvälised organisatsioonid 
on olulist rolli mänginud nii rahvusvahelistel konverentsidel kui ka rahvusvaheliste 
konventsioonide vastuvõtmisel (nt. Loodusliku mitmekesisuse konventsioon, Lapse õiguste 
konventsioon). Seoses sellise muutunud osalejate ringiga rahvusvahelisel areenil, satub 
kahtluse alla riigikeskne lähenemine rahvusvahelise õiguse subjektidele. 
Rahvusvahelise õiguse arengule ning mõjutamisele saab kaasa aidata mitmel viisil. Üheks 
selliseks võimaluseks on läbi amicus curiae (otsetõlge lad. k. kohtu sõber) staatuse. Amicus 
curiae näol on tegemist pooltest sõltumatu institutsiooniga, kelle huvi kattub vaidluse all oleva 
vaidluse objektiga. Sellist huvi on nähtud rahvusvahelises avalikus õiguses eelkõige 
inimõiguste, keskkonnaõiguse ja humanitaarõiguse valdkonnas. Järelikult on amicus curiae 
huvi kaitsta teatud suuremat hüve ja õigusi kui pelgalt kaitsta ühte poolt ning tema huve 
menetluses. Siinjuures tuleb rõhutada, et amicus curiae ei ole viis poole esindamiseks kohtus 
ega mõeldud ka valitsusvälise organisatsiooni kaasamiseks vaidluse pooleks. Tegemist on oma 
ala spetsialistiga, kes jagab menetluse hüvanguks oma nõu. 
Käesolev magistritöö käsitleb ühe mõjugrupi, so valitsusväliste organisatsioonide, osalust 
amicus curiaena rahvusvaheliste vaidluse lahendamise kohtute ja tribunalide ees. 
Uurimisobjektist tulenevalt ongi võetud uurimiseks järgnevad probleemid. Esiteks, kas ja mis 
tingimustel valitsusvälised organisatsioonid saavad osaleda rahvusvahelises õiguses amicus 
curiaena. Kui vastus on jaatav, siis kas nendega arvestatakse ja milline on nende panus vaidluse 
lahendamisse.  
Magistritöö lähtub hüpoteesist, et kuigi rahvusvaheline õigus on igas aspektis mõjutatud 
erinevatest osalejatest, pole võimalik leida ühiseid kriteeriume erinevates vaidluse lahendamise 
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institutsioonides amicus curiae lubatavuseks. Juhul kui amicus curiaed on lubatud protsessi, 
siis nende panusega arvestatakse. 
Analüüsi teostamisel on kasutatud peamiselt nelja meetodit: ajaloolist, induktiivset, empiirilist 
ning võrdlevat. Ajaloolise meetodi kaudu on tuvastatud ning analüüsitud vajalike sätete 
kujunemist ja põhjuseid, st eelkõige kuidas neid sätteid tõlgendada. Empiirilise meetodiga on 
uuritud kohtupraktikat ning kohtute seisukohti seoses valitsusväliste organisatsioonide 
kaasamisega. Nende empiiriliste järelduste põhjalt on induktiivse meetodiga tehtud üldisi 
järeldusi rahvusvahelise õiguse kohta seoses valitsusväliste organisatsioonide amicus curiaena 
osalemisega. Töös on kasutatud ka võrdlevat meetodit, mille alusel on võrreldud erinevaid 
kohtuid ning nende seisukohti ning nende pinnalt tehtud taaskord induktiivseid järeldusi üldise 
olukorra kohta rahvusvahelisel areenil. 
Käesoleva magistritöö autor analüüsib nelja erinevat vaidluse lahendamise instantsi 
valitsusväliste organisatsioonide amicus curiaena osaluse valguses. Need institutsioonid on 
jagatud kolme gruppi: riigikeskseteks, avaliku huve ja indiviidi huve kaitsvateks kohtuteks. 
Riigikesksete institutsioonide alla on nii Rahvusvaheline Kohus kui ka Maailmakaubanduse 
organisatsioon. Kuigi mõlemad on riigikesksed vaidluse lahendamise instantsid, on nende 
praktika ja seisukohad valitsusväliste organisatsioonide amicus curiaena kaasamises erinevad. 
See on ka põhjus, miks käesolevas töös valis autor just need organisatsioonid riigikesksete 
organisatsioonide esindajateks. Teise grupi moodustavad avaliku huve kaitsevad kohtud ja 
tribunal Rahvusvahelise Kriminaalkohtu ning Rahvusvaheliste Kriminaaltribunalide (Endise 
Jugoslaavia Rahvusvahelise Kriminaaltribunali ja Sierra Leone Tribunali) näol. Kolmanda 
grupi moodustavad regionaalsed inimõigusi kaitsvad kohtud, so Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohus ja 
Ameerika Inimõiguste Kohus.  
Üldjuhul riigikesksetes organisatsioonides on amicus curiae kaasamine valitsusväliste 
organisatsioonide näol pigem mittesoositud. Peamise vastuargumendina on siin toodud 
asjaolud, et tegemist on riikidevaheliste suhetega ning riigid ei taha mitteriiklikke faktoreid 
kaasata. Olukorras, kus aga rahvusvahelisel areenil on riigid suurimad ja olulisemad mõjutajad, 
on tegemist päris tugeva argumendiga. Kuigi käimaks kaasas rahvusvahelise õiguse trendide 
muutmisega, oleks arengu perspektiivist oluline ka siinkohal kaugemale mõelda.  
Riigikesksetest organisatsioonidest Rahvusvaheline Kohus pole oma asjades sisuliste kaasuste 
puhul kunagi lubanud valitsusväliseid organisatsioone osalema. Peamiselt põhjusel, et tegemist 
pole Rahvusvahelise Kohtu Statuudi artikli 34(2) alusel “rahvusvahelise avaliku 
organisatsiooniga”. Kohus ise on seda mõistet tõlgendanud riikidevahelise organisatsioonina. 
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Sellele vaatamata on õiguskirjanduses väidetud, et seda terminit tuleks tõlgendada kui 
rahvusvahelise avaliku huviga tegelev organisatsioon. Peamiseks sellise teooria pooldajaks on 
Dinah Shelton. Teise võimaliku alusena amicus curiae kaasamiseks protsessi on nähtud 
statuudi artiklit 50, mis annab avatud nimekirja subjektide ringile, kes võivad kohtus oma 
arvamust avaldada. Selle nimekirja alla läheks ka valitsusvälised organisatsioonid. Kuigi kuna 
artikkel 50 räägib kohtu õigusest kutsuda artikli nimekirjas olev subjekt kohtusse, siis pole 
käesoleva töö autori arvates õige siinkohal rääkida amicus curiae osalusest. Selle põhjuseks on 
asjaolu, et tavaliselt peab amicus curiae kohtusse pöörduma omal algatusel. 
Rahvusvaheline kohus on Edela-Aafrika rahvusvahelise staatuse arvamuses lubanud 
valitsusvälise organisatsiooni Rahvusvahelise Inimõiguste Liidu amicus curiaena osalema. 
Kuigi luba osalemiseks saadi, siis ületati tähtaega, mille jooksul pidi kohtusse saabuma 
nimetatud organisatsiooni arvamus. Sellest tulenevalt Kohus lõpuks esitatud arvamust siiski 
vastu ei võtnud. Peale seda kaasust pole Rahvusvaheline Kohus enam kunagi lubanud  
valitsusväliseid organisatsioone osalema ning 2000ndate aastate alguses andis välja ka prakika 
tõlgendamise juhise, kus on kirjas, et valitsusväliste organisatsioonide esitatud seisukohti ei 
loeta toimiku osaks. Seda on nähtud enamasti kui keeldu valitsusväliste organisatsioonide 
osalemiseks amicus curiaena. 
Erinevalt Rahvusvahelisest Kohtust on Maailma kaubandusorganisatsioon olnud leebem 
valitsusvälistele organisatsioonidele amicus curiae staatuse andmisel. Maailma 
kaubandusorganisatsiooni aktides puudub sõnaselge alus amicus curiaede lubamiseks. Samas 
on kohtu paneelid seda vastavalt vajadusele siiski teinud. Esimese astme paneelis on amicus 
curiae alusena nähtud vaidluste lahendamist reguleerivate eeskirjade ja protseduuride 
käsitusleppe artikleid 12 ja 13. Vaidlustuse paneelis on aluseks võetud vaidluste lahendamist 
reguleerivate eeskirjade ja protseduuride käsitusleppe artikkel 17 ning töökorralduse reegel 
16(1).  
Oluliseks kaasuseks Maailma kaubandusorganisatsioonis amicuse lubamiseks on Ameerika 
Ühendriigid-Krevetid kaasus, mis oli esimene kaasus, mis tõlgendas nimetatud artiklit 13 
laiendavalt. Sellest tulenevalt kaasati ka amicus curiaed protsessi. Hiljem on sama kaasust 
kasutatud mitmetes teistes kaasustes amicuse kaasamise õigustamiseks. Kuigi näha on ka 
peamise vastuargumendi säilimist. Nimelt selle organisatsiooni näol on tegemist riikidevahelise 
organisatsiooniga.  
Vaidlustuse paneel läks oma tõlgendustes seoses amicus curiae lubatavusega kaugemale 
kaasuses Euroopa Ühnedus-Asbest. Selles kaasuses lubas kohus kõigil, kellel on soov oma 
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seisukoht esitada, seda teha. Sellega jättis kohus määratlemata isikute ringi, mistõttu sisuliselt 
võiks ka indiviidid oma seisukohti esitada. Osade riikide seas tekitas selline otsus pahameelt.   
Nii Kriminaal Tribunalides kui ka Rahvusvahelises Kriminaalkohus pole probleemiks 
normatiivne alus amicus curiae osaluseks. See on olemas. Veelgi enam nimetatud instantsid on 
soosivad valitsusväliste organisatsioonide osalemisel ning on mitmetes kaasustes andnud neile 
amicus curiae staatuse. Soosivus on selgelt näha Rahvusvahelise Kriminaalkohtu praktikast. 
Samas tavaliselt seab kohus kindlad kriteeriumid amicuse seisukohtadele. Näiteks, et amicus 
curiae võib oma arvamust avaldada vaid teatud küsimuste osas. Kohus lõplikes lahendites 
amicus curiae panusele ega seisukohtadele üldjuhul ei viita.  
Soosivad amicus curiae seisukohalt on ka regionaalsed inimõiguseid kaitsvad kohtud. Euroopa 
Inimõiguste ja Põhivabaduste kaitse konventsioon näeb artiklis 36(2) ette kolmanda isiku 
osalemise võimaluse asjas ja annab loa igale isikule asjas oma seisukoht esitada. Kuigi tegemist 
on kolmanda osapoole sekkumisõiguse sättega ning see säte ei räägi konkreetselt amicus curiae 
osalusest, siis on just seda sätet nähtud amicus curiaena osalemise alusena. Erinevalt 
Kriminaalkohtust ning Kriminaal Tribunalidest on Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohus mõnedes 
kaasustes teinud oma lahendites kokkuvõtted protsessis osalenud amicus curiaede 
seisukohtadest. Samuti on nähtud nende osalemises kõrget väärtust. Näiteks Soering vs 
Suurbritannia kaasuses, Amnesty International amicusena veenis kohut, et surmanuhkus on 
ebainimlik meede Euroopa Inimõiguste ja põhivabaduste kaitse konventsiooni valguses.  
Ameerika Inimõiguste Kohus on lubanud suurel hulgal valitsusväliseid organisatsioone 
osalema läbi oma seisukohtade esitamise kohtuasjade lahendamisel. Seevastu oma sisulistes 
istungites ei viita kohus mitte kunagi nende seisukohtadele. Arvamuse avaldamise kaasustes on 
kokkuvõtted amicuse seisukohatadest leitavad lahenditest. 
Analüüsi käigus selgus eelkõige, et amicus curiae alusena saab näha nii organi konstitutiivset 
lepingut (nt Euroopa inimõiguste ja põhivabaduste kaitse konventsioon) või organi enda 
sisemisi reegleid (nt Rahvusvaheline Kriminaalkohtu ja Kriminaaltribunalide 
protsessireegleid). Lisaks selgus analüüsi käigus, et enamasti lubatakse amicus curiaena 
osaleda rahvusvahelistele valitsusvälistel organisatsioonidel, kuid Ameerika Inimõiguste 
Kohus lubab osaleda ka regionaalsetel organisatsioonidel. Kuigi viimane on pigem erandlik 
juhtum.  
Üldjuhul on amicus curiaena esineda soovivad valitsusvälised organisatsioonid 
rahvusvaheliselt üldtuntud ühingud, nagu nt Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch. 
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Kuigi ka vähem tuntud rahvusvahelised valitsusvälised organisatsioonid on sellisest 
võimalusest olnud huvitatud.  
Üldkokkuvõttes on võimalik näha mõningaseid üldiseid jooni amicus curiaede osalusel 
analüüsitud institutsioonides. Eelkõige selles osas, et need kohtud, kes lubavad valitsusvälistel 
organisatsioonidel amicus curiaena osaleda, seavad sellele ka teatud piirid. Samas kõik kohtud 
seda ei luba, mistõttu on erinevates kohtutes erinev regulatsioon ja praktika. Teatud 
institutsioonides, kes annavad valitsusvälistele organisatsioonidele soovitava amicuse staatuse, 
on selliste organisatsioonide panuseid ka väärtustatud. Suures osas jääb aga väärtus 
tuvastamatuks.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Art   Article 
DSB  Dispute Settlement Body 
DSU  World Trade Organisation’s Dispute Settlement Understanding  
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights  
ETS   European Treaty Series 
GA  General Assembly 
ICC  International Criminal Court  
ICJ   International Court of Justice   
ICTR  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia 
ILO  International Labour Organization 
INGO              International non-governmental organization 
ITLOS  International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
NGO  Non-governmental organization 
OAS  Organization of American States 
PCIJ  Permanent Court of International Justice 
Res  Resolution 
SCSL  Special Court for Sierra Leone 
UN   United Nations 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNTS  United Nation Treaty Series 
WTO   World Trade Organisation 
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